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Sexual Equality, the Equal Protection Clause,
and the ERA
PHYLLIS N. SEGAL*
INTRODUCTION
G OVERNMENT policies reflecting and reinforcing sexual ine-
quality have only recently-and only in certain circum-
stances-been condemned by the judiciary as violating the Consti-
tution's equal protection clause.' Official action explicitly treating
individuals differently on the basis of their sex2 was once widely
validated as constitutional.3 Today such expressly differential
treatment generally is understood to offend the Constitution's
equality command, so long as the differential treatment is not per-
* B.A., University of Michigan, 1966; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1973.
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earlier drafts, including Stephanie Clohesy, Ann Freedman, Sylvia Law, Anne Simon, Na-
dine Taub, Wendy Williams, Thomas Emerson, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Herma Hill Kay,
and Deborah Rhode. Special thanks to Aviam Soifer for his encouragement and counsel,
and to Eli, Jon, and Mora Segal for their enduring support.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. Added to the Constitution by the fourteenth amend-
ment, this provision was founded upon a desire to prevent discrimination against former
slaves. The "equal protection of the law" guaranteed by this provision has not been lim-
ited, however, to this purpose. The provision's vague literal command has been applied to
disfavor discrimination against other groups and individuals as well. See generally 2 N. DOR-
sEN, P. BENDER, B. NEwBORNE & J. GoRA, EMERSON, HABER, AND DoRSEN'S POLrICAL AND
CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNrrED STATES 44-62 (4th ed. 1979). In addition, the fifth amendment
has been interpreted to impose upon the federal government an "equality command"
equivalent to that imposed on the states by the fourteenth amendment. See Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
2. Examples of such official action include statutes distinguishing between wives and
husbands, mothers and fathers, widows and widowers, and girls and boys. See infra notes
21-35 and accompanying text. A distinction is often made between the terms "sex" and
"gender," with the former seen as the biological and the latter as the socio-cultural aspect
of being female or male. See, e.g., A. OAKLEY, SEX, GENDER AND Sociry 16-17, 158-72
(1972). This distinction is not addressed here, and in this Article the two terms are used
interchangeably.
3. See infra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
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ceived to be justified by "real differences" between the sexes.4 Be-
cause of the ambiguous and self-fulfilling nature of this qualifica-
tion, however, no uniform constitutional doctrine has emerged to
invalidate even the explicit use of sex as a classifying tool.8 More-
over, the current approach to sex-discrimination claims under the
equal protection clause remains a fundamentally inadequate way
of redressing the persistent patterns of sexual inequality' because
4. See infra note 175.
5. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 468 (1981)
(describing Court's difficulty in agreeing upon the proper analysis in cases involving chal-
lenges to gender-based classifications); Hewitt v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 294 Or. 33, 653
P.2d 970 (1982) (noting inconsistency of results under U.S. Supreme Court's equal protec-
tion scrutiny, and the "kaleidoscope of standards and rationales" underlying those deci-
sions); Peters v. Narick, 270 S.E.2d 760, 764 (W. Va. 1980) (describing heightened scrutiny
of sex-based laws under the federal equal protection clause as "largely the product of 're-
sult-oriented' decisionmaking"); Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 583 S.W.2d 162,
168 (Mo. 1979) (Donnelly, J., concurring), rev'd, 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (noting "no identifi-
able 'supreme Law of the Land' . . . by which [lower courts] may adjudicate a claim of
alleged gender based discrimination"). See generally Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences,
and the Supreme Court, 92 YAE L.J. 913, 922-31 (1983).
6. The persistence of sexual inequality is manifest in many ways. In employment, for
example, despite dramatically increased participation, women continue to be concentrated
in female-intensive low-paying job categories. U.S. DEVT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STA-
Txsncs, WOMEN AT WORK: A CIARTooK 10-11 (1983) (in 1982, 99% of secretaries, 96% of
nurses, and 82% of elementary school teachers were women). See also Rytina & Bianchi,
Occupational Reclassification and Changes in Distribution By Gender, 107 MONTHLY LAB. REv.
11, 16 (1984) (although number of women in certain professional and managerial occupa-
tions previously dominated by men increased in the 1970's, the number of occupations that
were female-intensive remained the same). Sex-stereotyped education and biased vocational
counseling channel men to certain jobs and women to others. See, e.g., N. ROMER, THE SEX-
ROLE CYCLE: SOCIAIZATON FROM INFANCY To OLD AGE 70-79 (1980). See also infra note 155
and accompanying text (underrepresentation of women in government decisionmaking
roles).
This occupational segregation of the sexes reinforces the general sexual hierarchy, as
the work women do in the paid labor force is consistently devalued. In 1982, wage-working
women were paid, on the average, only 61 cents for every dollar paid to men. See U.S.
CENsus BuREAu, CuRRENT PoPuLATIoN REPORTS, SERIES P-60, No. 140 (based on median
earnings of full-time, year-round workers in the experienced labor force). See infra note
103. Women also perform a disproportionate amount of unpaid work at home, vhich gen-
erally is accorded no economic value at all. See Hartmann, The Family as the Locus of Gender,
Class and Political Struggle: The Example ofHousework, 6 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOc'Y
366 (1981). The devaluation of women's work as homemakers permeates domestic rela-
tions law. See L. WErrzmAN, THE MARRIAGE CoNTRACr 66-80 (1981). See also infra note 27.
Also, since work done within the home traditionally has not been viewed as "real work,"
pensions and disability insurance have not been available for homemakers in their own
right. See U.S. DE'T OF JusTInc, THE PENSION GAME: THE AMERICAN PENSION SYSTEM FROM
THE VIEwPonrr OF THE AVERAGE WOMAN 4-7, 21 (1979) [hereinafter cited as THE PENSION
GAME].
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it effectively addresses only one of the several mechanisms
through which such inequality is officially sanctioned and
maintained.
This Article examines one significant mechanism of sex dis-
crimination that continues to be beyond the reach of contempo-
rary equal protection law: official conduct that maintains sexual
inequality without drawing sex-explicit classification lines. As de-
veloped in Section I, the same sex-biased views and misconcep-
tions that historically have translated into expressly discriminatory
action also may influence and deform the design of laws and prac-
tices that are not defined in sex-explicit or exclusive terms. Al-
though such laws and practices typically are labeled "facially sex-
neutral," and are thereby distinguished from conduct based on
sex per se, substantial similarities between both types of action
often exist. In addition to carrying the same "baggage of sexual
stereotypes," 7 both may result from "habit, rather than analysis or
reflection"4-the "accidental by-product[s]" of "cultural condi-
tioning." 10 Moreover, both may cause significant sex-based harm.
For this reason, it is illusory to equate "equality" with facial "neu-
trality." As the analysis in Section I confirms, mere insistence on
facial neutrality is not sufficient to eliminate sexual segregation
and hierarchy.
Current federal equal protection doctrine is examined in Sec-
tion II. Judicial interpretation during the 1970's and 1980's ap-
plied the equal protection clause to prohibit a layer of overtly dis-
criminatory governmental action that previously had been
considered reasonable." However, because it is rooted in a nar-
row view of inequality and is not clearly targeted to sex discrimi-
nation, this judicial interpretation still has not invalidated some
As women today increasingly swell the ranks of those living at or below the poverty
level, the extent of sexual hierarchy in the economy becomes increasingly evident. See, e.g.,
U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, A GROWING CRISIS: DISADVANTAGED WOMEN AND THEIR CHIL-
DREN 36-39 (1983). It has been estimated that if present trends continue, by the year 2000
all those living in poverty will be women and children in women-headed households. NAT'L
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, CRITICAL CHOICES FOR THE 80's, at 19
(1980).
7. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979).
8. Lehr v. Robertson, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 2996 n.24 (1983).
9. Califano v. Goldfarb, 480 U.S. 199, 223 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
10. Castellano v. Linden Bd. of Educ., 79 N.J. 407, 420, 400 A.2d 1182, 1188 (1979)
(Handler, J., concurring and dissenting).
11. See infra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
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forms of blatant discrimination and has not begun to reach the
more subtle, but no less destructive, ways in which governmental
actions reinforce sexual inequality. Under current equal protec-
tion doctrine, there is no meaningful scrutiny of governmental
policies and practices that are facially neutral but in fact discrimi-
nate against women. Such action is measured against the "tradi-
tionally toothless" 2 rationality standard, unless a plaintiff can
show that the action was adopted or reaffirmed at least in part
because it harmed the disadvantaged sex.13 This "illicit intent" re-
quirement fundamentally misconceives the nature and harm of
sexual inequality and operates to sanction its continuation.
This examination of the limits of contemporary equal protec-
tion law and the critique of the narrow view of equality it reflects
serves to clarify how the proposed federal equal rights amend-
ment (ERA),1 4 and similar state constitutional equal rights provi-
sions, 5 should be interpreted so that they can effectively remedy
the problem of sexual inequality. Section III of this Article de-
scribes how facially neutral action should be scrutinized under a
constitutional provision aimed at securing "equal rights under law
. . . on account of sex."16
12. Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on
a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 18-19 (1972).
13. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (discussed infra notes
206-40 and accompanying text).
14. H.R.J. Res. 1, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983); S.J. Res. 10, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129
CONG. REc. 5529-30 (1983). For history, see infra notes 256-57.
15. Sixteen states have "equal rights" provisions in their constitutions: ALAsKA CONsr.
art. 1, § 3 (1972); CoLO. CONST. art. II, § 29 (1972); CONN. CONST. art. I, §20 (1974); HA-
wAn CONST. art. I, § 5 (1972); Imi CONsT. art. I, § 18 (1971); MD. CONST. art. 46 (1972);
MASs. CONST. part 1, art. CVI (amending art. 1)(1976); MONT. CONST. art. 2, § 4 (1973);
N.H. CONST. part 1, art. 11 (1974); N.M. CONST. art. 2, § 18 (1973); PA. CONST. art. I, § 28
(1971); Tax. CONST. art. I, § 3 (1972); UTAH CONsT. art. 4, § 1 (1896); VA. CONST. art. I, §
11 (1971); WAsH. CoNsT. art. 31, § 1 (1972); and Wyo. CONST. art. 1, §§ 2, 3 & art. 6, § 1
(1890). Nine of the state provisions listed above are substantially similar to the proposed
federal ERA. See the provisions of Colorado, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hamp-
shire, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington.
16. H.R.J. Res. 1, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1983). The full text of the proposed ERA
provides:
Sec. 1: Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Sec. 2: The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate leg-
islation, the provisions of this Article.
Sec. 3: This Amendment shall take effect two years after the date of
ratification.
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I. FACIALLY NEUTRAL LAWS AND PRACTICES ENFORCING AND
PERPETUATING DESTRUCTIVE PATTERNS OF SEXUAL INEqUALITY
Judicial scrutiny of sex-discrimination claims has unveiled
many of the generalizations and judgments about females and
males that have shaped governmental decisionmaking. These
views have included: "traditional" notions about appropriate roles
for women and men in the family and in public life;17 generaliza-
tions about the dependency of wives on their husbands; 8 stereo-
types about the physical, emotional and mental capabilities of
males and females;19 and assumptions about male and female sex-
ual roles and character.20
17. See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 10, 14-15 (1974) (describing, but not en-
dorsing, "old notions" underlying challenged statutory distinction between males and fe-
males, including that it is "man's primary responsibility to provide a home"); Hoyt v. Flor-
ida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961) ("woman is still regarded as the center of home and family
life"); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908) ("[t]he two sexes differ . . . in the
functions to be performed by each"); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141-42
(1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) (describing separate spheres and destinies of men and
women).
18. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1978) (holding that statute can not be
predicated on states's preference for "allocation of family responsibilities under which the
wife plays a dependent role"); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. at 14; Schlesinger v. Ballard,
419 U.S. 498, 507 (1975) (describing as based solely on administrative convenience the
assumption underlying the statutory distinction between men and women that "female
spouses of servicemen would normally be dependent upon their husbands while male
spouses of servicewomen would not").
19. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 n.10 (1982)
("legislators believed women less able than men"); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,
343-44 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (women viewed as not being strict disciplinarians
and as physically less capable than men of protecting themselves); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971) (men viewed as better qualified for business); Attorney Gen. v. Massachusetts
Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 378 Mass. 342, 349-60, 393 N.E.2d 284, 293 (1979) (general
male athletic superiority); Gordon v. Gordon, 577 P.2d 1271, 1277 (Okla.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 863 (1978) (gender-related "cultural, psychological and emotional characteristics"
with respect to child rearing).
20. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. at 345 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (women
as "seductive sexual objects"); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948) (bartending by
women may "give rise to moral and social problems"), overruled in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 210 n.23 (1976); Wikler, Equal Treatment for Men and Women in the Courts, 64 JuDicA-
TURE 202, 206 (1980) (describing 'judicial myths concerning the nature of male and female
sexuality"); Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts and Feminism, 7
WOMEN'S Rrs. L. REP. 175, 185-87 (describing stereotypes implicit in Supreme Court opin-
ion concerning male sexual aggression and female passivity); Note, Rape and Rape Laws:
Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CALI. L. Rnv. 919, 931-33, 938 (1973) (describing views that
women are hostile to men and will continue to fabricate rape testimony, and that men and
women have differing ability to arouse and control sexual desire).
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Such views have been translated into policies and practices
that reinforce the stereotypes by pressing females into one mold
and males into another, and maintain a hierarchy of the sexes in
which women are subordinate.2 1 For example, notions that the
"female [is] destined solely for the home and the rearing of the
family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of
ideas" '2  have shaped laws enforcing a sex-defined allocation of
family responsibilities,23 denying women employment, 24 and dero-
gating the importance of educational opportunities for girls.2 5
Generalizations about appropriate roles and female dependency
have been at the root of a sex-based distribution of benefits that
discounts the earnings of women.2 They have resulted in laws
and practices that diminish or disregard the economic value of
childrearing and domestic work done in the home27 and denigrate
21. See generally C. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 101-41
(1979); Taub & Schneider, Perspectives on Women's Subordination and the Role of Law, in THE
PoLrms OF LAW 117-39 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
22. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. at 14-15 (criticizing such a notion).
23. See, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 457-58, 460-61 (1981) (state statute
naming husband the "head and master" and granting him unilateral right to manage and
dispose of jointly owned property without wife's consent: held invalid under equal protec-
tion clause); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. at 278-79 (state statute authorizing imposition of alimony
obligations on husbands only: invalidated). See also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 11 (West
1976) (repealed 1983) (preferred mothers as custodians of young children and fathers as
custodians of children "of an age to require education and preparation for labor or
business").
24. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 131-33, 138-39 (1873) (bar-
ring women from practicing law). So-called "protective" labor laws directly banned women
from jobs such as mining and bartending, and indirectly denied women jobs by prohibiting
them from certain activities such as heavy lifting or overtime work. See J. BAER, THE
CHAINS OF PROTa=ON: THE JuDICAL RESPONSE TO WOMEN'S LABOR LEGISLAMON (1978).
25. See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. at 10, 14-15 (requirements that male chil-
dren be supported until age 21 and female children until age 18 traced to notions that boys
need a good education before undertaking responsibilities while girls are likely to marry
early: invalidated).
26. See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 143-46, 150-52
(1980) (state statute granting death benefits to widows, but not widowers, who have not
proven incapacity or economic dependence on deceased spouse: invalidated); Califano v.
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 201, 202 (1977) (federal statute granting social security survivors'
benefits to all widows but only widowers able to prove actual dependency on deceased wife:
invalidated); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 637-39 (1975) (federal statute grant-
ing social security survivors' benefits to widowed mothers but not fathers: invalidated).
27. For discussion of the failure of marriage and divorce laws to recognize the home-
maker's contribution to a marriage in determining the homemaker's economic position,
see L. WErrzsmA, THE MARRIAGE CoNTRACT 64-87 (1981); Krauskopf, A Theory for "Just"
Division of Marital Property in Missouri, 41 Mo. L. REv. 165, 168-69 (1976); cf Gebhard v.
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women's role in the paid work force.2 8 Assumptions about male
and female capabilities have been reflected in statutory prefer-
ences for males to carry out certain business tasks,29 and rules bar-
ring females from particular jobs 0 and activities.$1 Exclusionary
rules also have been anchored in stereotypes about the sexual re-
lationships between males and females. 2 In addition, stereotypes
about the sexes have shaped criminal laws and practices that ei-
ther ignore 3 or deny the credibility of" females victimized by
rape, and that treat female victims as responsible for the violence
Gebhard, 253 Md. 125, 127-30, 252 A.2d 171, 172-74 (1969) (court ignores wife's contri-
bution to acquisition of marital assets as homemaker, hostess, and secretary; husband is
deemed sole owner of assets). Devaluation of homemaking and child-rearing work also is
reflected in federal welfare policy. See Law, Women, Work, Welfare and the Preservation of
Patriarchy, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 1249, 1251-52, 1318-21, 1328-36 (1983). In contrast, domes-
tic work done by women traditionally has been accorded an economic value when a hus-
band has sought to recover damages from a third party who negligently injured his wife.
See H. CLARK, THE LAW OF Do ST~c RELATIONS 261 (1961).
28. For example, government programs have reflected the assumption that a family
faces economic need only when the husband loses his job; the wife's salary is assumed to be
secondary. See Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 87-88 (1979). Federal'welfare law gives
low-income men priority over low-income women in the allocation of scarce jobs. See Law,
supra note 27, at 1282, 1286-94. In addition, an extensive analysis by Professor Ruth
Blumrosen documents that "the wage rates ofjobs into which women ... have been his-
torically segregated are likely to be depressed" because the jobs are held by women. Blum-
rosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 U.
MicH. J.L. REF. 397, 402-57 (1979). Accord, Law, supra note 27, at 1283, 1294-1310 (sys-
tematic devaluation of women's work by federal government).
29. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 73, 74 (1971) (statutory preference for males
to act as estate administrators: invalidated); Corpus Christi Parish Credit Union v. Martin,
358 So. 2d 295, 302 (La.) (Tate, Calogero & Dennis, JJ., dissenting), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
897 (1978) (statute granting exclusive authority to husbands to mortgage or sell marital
property; subsequently invalidated in Kirschberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981)).
30. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. at 332-33 n.16 (regulation denying
women jobs as correctional officers in maximum security prisons).
31. See, e.g., Cape v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n, 563 F.2d 793, 795-
96 (6th Cir. 1977) (rule limiting high school girls to split-court basketball); Bucha v. Illinois
High School Ass'n, 351 F. Supp. 69, 71 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (rule prohibiting high school girls
from competing with boys in swimming and imposing other restrictions on girls' athletic
contests which do not apply to boys' contests).
32. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. at 345 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing
assumption that women will provoke sexual assaults as justification for denying women jobs
as prison guards). \
33. In most states, rape in marriage is not considered a crime. See D. RussELL, RAPE iN
MARRIAGE 17 (1982). Some states have extended this "marital rape exemption" to men
who are cohabiting with women with whom they are not legally married. Id. at 21-22. The
origins of such rape laws are generally traced to the idea that women are the sexual prop-
erty of their husbands and cannot retract their consent to sexual intercourse. Id. at 3, 17,
225-69. See Bienen, Rape Ill-National Developments in Rape Reform Legislation, 6 WOMEN's
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they experienced.35
The process through which ideas and attitudes about the
sexes influence governmental policies is complex and often subtle.
The Supreme Court has described the adoption of sexually dis-
criminatory laws as "having escaped virtually unnoticed,"36 as the
"accidental by-product of traditional ways of thinking about fe-
males,"37 and as the result of "habit, rather than analysis or re-
flection." 8 Indifference to the detrimental impact of policies on
women has been recognized as the "traditional hallmark" of sex
discrimination." Although courts have noted the possibility that
governmental practices may be traced to a decisionmaker's dis-
criminatory intent,40 those that have been condemned are more
typically described as the product of misguided benign motives,
habit, or indifference.41
These judicial insights into the nature of sex discrimination
have emerged largely in cases reviewing laws and practices ex-
pressly defining different rights or responsibilities for females and
males. But it is not only sex-explicit line drawing that presents the
problems which have been identified. Laws and practices that de-
Rrs. L. REP. 170, 184-89 (1977); Note, The Marital Rape Exemption, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 306
(1977).
34. See, e.g., Oregon v. Bashaw, 296 Or. 50, 672 P.2d 48, 48-49 (1983) (traditional
cautionary jury instruction reflecting assumption that "alleged rape victims are less trust-
worthy witnesses than other victims of crime": rejected by court); Packineau v. United
States, 202 F.2d 681, 685-86 (8th Cir. 1953) (prior sexual activity seen to impugn credibil-
ity; accusation of rape easily made); Berger, Man's Trial, Women's Tribulation: Rape Cases in
the Courtroom, 77 COLuM. L. REv. 1, 12-32 (1977); Wood, The Victim in a Forcible Rape Case:
A Feminist View, in RAPE VxcrsoLx;o 194, 195-213 (L. Schultz ed. 1975).
35. See, e.g., Packineau v. United States, 202 F.2d at 687 (alleged rape victim had "vol-
untarily placed herself in... an equivocal position with the young men"); Berger, supra
note 34, at 25-27 ("blaming the victim"); Note, supra note 20, at 929-30 (concept of victim
precipitation).
36. Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 87 (1979).
37. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
38. Lehr v. Robertson, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2996 n.24 (1983); see also Matthews v. Lucas,
427 U.S. 495, 520 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[h]abit, rather than analysis, makes it
seem acceptable and natural to distinguish between male and female").
39. See Blumberg, De Facto and De Jure Sex Discrimination Under the Equal Protection
Clause: A Reconsideration of the Veteran's Preference in Public Employment, 26 BuFFALO L. Rv.
1, 38 (1976).
40. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279.
41. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. at 283; Attorney Gen. v. Massachusetts Interscholas-
tic Athletic Ass'n, 378 Mass. at 356 n.32, 395 N.E.2d at 292 n.32 ("benign purposes may
inadvertently perpetuate outmoded stereotypes" and carry the "inherent risk of reinforc-
ing" them).
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fine their classification lines in terms of characteristics or func-
tions may carry the same "baggage of sexual stereotypes." They
may operate to enforce similar sex-based harm and be attributable
to the same habitual ways of thinking. While some characterize as
"gender-neutral" any law that is not written in, or any practice
that is not predicated upon, sex-explicit terms, closer examination
reveals that at least in some situations such a benign label is
deceptive.
The similarities between facially neutral governmental actions
and those that are based explicitly on sex are evident in the osten-
sibly "neutral" aspects of federal social security law, statutes regu-
lating private pensions, employment-related policies, laws gov-
erning marriage and divorce, and the design of government
welfare programs."2
A. Federal Social Security Law
It is widely acknowledged today that generalizations about ap-
propriate roles of men and women and about the dependency of
wives on their husbands caused Congress to establish different
benefits for males and females under the social security law as first
enacted.43  Such sex-based generalizations produced provisions
granting benefits to surviving spouses who were mothers, but not
fathers," and to widows but not widowers who were unable to
42. Other areas of government policy that illustrate this phenomenon include: (1)
Criminal law. See MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward Feminist Juris-
prudence, 8 SIGNS: J. WomEN IN CULTURE & Soc'Y 635, 646-55 (1983) (rape laws); Schneider,
Equal Rights to Trialfor Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REv.
623 (1980) (law of self-defense). (2) Taxation. See Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Compara-
tive Study of Income Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BurnLO L. REv. 49 (1971). (3)
Public education. See LeMaire, Women and Athletics: Toward A Physicality Perspective, 5 HAtv.
WOMEN'S L.J. 121 (1982) (athletics). See generally C. MACKiNNON, supra note 21, at 101-42,
223-32.
43. See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 205-07 (plurality opinion) (differential
treatment of widows and widowers under social security resulted from assumption that
"wives are usually dependent"); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 643-45 (differential
treatment of mothers and fathers traced to generalizations that men are more likely to be
primary supporters of spouses and children). See generally U.S. DsEP'T o HEW, SoCIAL SE-
CURITY AND THE CHANGING RoLEs OF MEN AND WoMEN 10-11, 25-33 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as CHANGING RoLEs]; Blumberg, Adult Derivative Benefits in Social Security, 32 STAN. L.
REv. 233, 242-46 (1980); Mikulski & Brown, Case Studies in the Treatment of Women Under
Social Security Law: The Need for Reform, 6 HARv. WoMEN's L.J. 29, 33-36 (1983).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1976 & Supp. V 1981), amended by Pub. L. No. 98-121 §
306(a), 97 Stat. 65, 113 (1983) (to provide same benefits to both parents).
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prove actual financial dependency on their deceased spouses.45 In
the past decade, many of these sex-explicit practices have been
recognized as discriminatory and declared invalid. 46 However, the
same assumptions underlying these sex-explicit provisions also
shaped the facially neutral design of certain fundamental struc-
tures in the social security law which have not been reformed.
Studies have documented how two basic premises of this sys-
tem-that the typical female is a lifelong dependent homemaker
while the typical male is a breadwinner, and that homemaking has
no economic-value-have operated to disadvantage women.
Ostensibly neutral provisions built upon these assumptions in-
clude the omission of any disability protection for homemakers,'48
the failure to provide retirement benefit credits for years spent in
homemaking,4'9 and the requirement that the surviving spouse
choose between benefits based on the individual's own wage-earn-
ing account and benefits based on the account of the deceased
spouse.50 Despite the facial neutrality of such rules-they apply to
male as well as female homemakers-they are anchored in the fa-
miliar stereotypic female-as-homemaker/male-as-breadwinner di-
chotomy and reflect indifference to women's needs for indepen-
dent economic security. Implementation of these ostensibly
neutral provisions results in lower retirement benefits for women
than for men51 and no benefits at all for some disabled women.5 2
For example, a widow under age sixty who spent her married
years as a homemaker may find herself ineligible for social secur-
ity benefits, since homemakers under that age cannot receive
45. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 402(e)(1) (1970 & Supp. V) with 42 U.S.C. § 402(f)(1)(D)
(1970 & Supp. V), amended by Pub. L. No. 95-216, § 334(d)(1), 91 Stat. 1509, 1545 (1977)
(to strike the requirement that a widower prove he was financially dependent on his de-
ceased wife).
46. See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (invalidating different eligibil-
ity requirements for widowers and widows); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636
(1975) (invalidating different benefits for mothers and fathers).
47. See CHANGING Roim, supra note 43, at 10-11, 20-33; Blumberg, supra note 43, at
242-26; Mikulski & Brown, supra note 43, at 36.
48. See CHMGING RoLEs, supra note 43, at 27-28.
49. See id. at 25-26.
50. See Blumberg, supra note 43, at 243.
51. The average monthly social security payment for retired female workers in 1982
was $362.20; for male workers, the average payment was $469.60. The average benefit
received by wives as dependents was $213.20, U.S. DEP'T or HEW, SocIAL. SEcmtrry BuLLE-
TiN ANNUAL STATImCAL SuPPLxmFNaTr 150 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982 STAT. Supp.].
52. See Blumberg, supra note 43, at 244; Mikulski & Brown, supra note 43, at 41.
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widow's benefits unless they are either fifty years of age and dis-
abled or are caring for dependent children." Without indepen-
dent social security credits, many homemakers receive no benefits
at all from the time they become widows until the age of sixty, a
period that has been called the "widow's gap."
The divorced woman who has worked within the home for all
or most of her married life faces additional problems. She will
find herself ineligible for social security benefits unless her mar-
riage lasted ten years.55 Even then, the most she can receive is half
of her former husband's benefits,56 although she is now maintain-
ing a separate household. She cannot receive even this sum until
her ex-husband retires,57 regardless of her needs.
The woman who has departed from the lifelong-homemaker
role and has spent some of her married years participating in the
paid work force fares no better, unless her wage-work experience
fits within the traditional male-as-breadwinner model. Provisions
determining retirement benefit levels by averaging earnings over
long periods of time 58 do not account for workers who take time
out of the paid work force for homemaking and child-care activi-
ties,5" and "recency of work" requirements for disability benefits
penalize those who leave and re-enter paid jobs to meet family
responsibilities.60
In sum, there are numerous ways in which women are disad-
53. 42 U.S.C.§§ 402(e)(1)(B), (g) (1982). In addition, a surviving spouse can claim a
benefit based on either the deceased spouse's account or on her own earnings; there is "no
mechanism to build the widow's contribution record on top of her deceased husband's."
Blumberg, supra note 43, at 240-41.
54. See CHANGING Rois, supra note 43, at 10; Mikulski & Brown, supra note 43, at 42.
The woman who elects to receive her benefits at the minimum retirement age for widows
(60) must take a substantial actuarial reduction in order to receive a benefit. Id. at 44.
55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b)(1), 416(d) (1982); see CHANGING RoLEs, supra note 43, at 23.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(2) (1982); see CHANGING RoLu, supra note 43, at 23-24. The
average monthly benefit for a male retiree in 1982 was $470. 1982 STAT. Supp., supra note
51, at 150. A divorced wife, entitled to half that amount, would receive only $235. Id.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1)(C)(i). See Blumberg, supra note 43, at 260. Moreover, if her
former husband decides to retire early, or make excess earnings after retirement, her max-
imum benefits may be reduced. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(q) (1982); Blumberg, supra note 43, at
259.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 415(b) (1982). See Blumberg, supra note 43, at 235-36 n.11. Professor
Blumberg notes that in "1991, retirement benefits will be based upon a 40-year work life,
which is, not fortuitously, the work-life expectancy of men born between 1940 and 1970."
Id. at 244 (footnotes omitted).
59. CHANGING RoLES, supra note 43, at 20-23; Blumberg, supra note 43, at 243-46.
60. CHANGING RoLEs, supra note 43, at 26-27; Blumberg, supra note 43, at 244 n.49.
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vantaged under a social security law that is firmly rooted in sex-
based assumptions about females and males. These assumptions
shaped the facially neutral provisions of this law just as certainly as
they influenced the more explicit lines of classification that now
are rejected as unconstitutional sex discrimination.
B. Pensions
An examination of laws regulating private pension systems
also illustrates how sex-based assumptions may affect the design of
purportedly neutral policies. Congress enacted the Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in 197461 to "protect em-
ployee benefit rights.16 2 This statute was premised in part on the
finding that "the continued well-being and security of millions of
employees and their dependents are directly affected by [pension]
plans." 363 A review of the minimum ERISA standards adopted
only a decade ago suggests, however, that when Congress per-
ceived "employees," the work experience of women, and the eco-
nomic value of the unpaid work typically performed by women at
home, was outside its vision."
As with social security, this government regulation of private
pension plans was built upon a model of the "worker in need of
security" as the traditional stereotype of the "breadwinner male."
While the model assumes that others may befinandally dependent
on this worker, it also assumes that the employee does not have
other types of family responsibilities. 5 Workers who enter and
leave the paid work force to devote time to childrearing, for ex-
ample, are less likely to conform to this model and consequently
to meet the minimum pension standards that are predicated on
the model.
Recognition of this disparity recently prompted Congress to
modify several of the standards originally incorporated in
61. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1201 (1982)) [hereinafter cited as ERISA].
62. Title I of ERISA is entitled: "Protection of Employee Benefit Rights." 88 Stat.
829, tit. I (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1201 (1982)).
63. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982).
64. See generally THE PENSION GAME, supra note 6, at 49-69; U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
WOMEN AND PRIVATE PENSION PLANS 10 (1980) [hereinafter cited as WOMEN AND PRIVATE
PENSION PLANS].
65. See THE PENSION GAME, supra note 6, at 6-7; WOMEN AND PRIVATE PENSION PLANS,
supra note 64, at 10.
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ERISA,66 underscoring the central principle that ostensibly neu-
tral rules built from a sex-based perspective may operate to disad-
vantage women. Examples of rules changed by the Retirement Eq-
uity Act of 1984 include pension participation provisions that
allowed employers to exclude workers under twenty-five years of
age67 and break-in-service rules that provided no protection to
workers on maternity or paternity leave. 8 Other rules left un-
changed include allowing employers to omit from pension cover-
age part-time workers and people who begin their jobs within five
years of the pension plan's retirement age.69 Minimum vesting pe-
riods tolerated under the statute still may be as long as ten years.70
While undoubtedly some men are affected by exclusions such as
these, and lose pension rights which never vest, the impact of such
rules falls more inevitably upon women who work in the paid la-
bor force while maintaining family responsibilities. 1
Women who enter and leave the paid Work force to devote
time to childrearing are less likely than workers without such re-
sponsibilities to accrue ten uninterrupted years with one em-
ployer.72 In addition to having shorter job tenure rates than men,
women are more likely to be employed part-time or during only
66. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984). See S.
REP. No. 575, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2547, 2554.
67. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, § 102(a)(1).
68. Id. at § 102(e).
69. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1052(a)(3)(A) (1982) (part-time workers, defined as those who com-
plete less than one thousand hours per year of service), 1052(a)(2)(B) (1982) (workers who
begin within five years of pension plan's retirement age).
70. Id. § 1058(a)(2)(A).
71. See, e.g., S. LAPROFF & E. FIERsr, WORKING WOMEN, MARRIAGE AND RRMENT
126-27, 167 (1980), reprinted in Hearings Before the House Select Committee on Aging, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 120, 126-27 (1981) (working paper for the President's Commission on Pen-
sion Policy).
72. See S. LAPgoFF & E. FmasRT, supra note 71, at 167; CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERv.,
Lm. OF CONG., 96TH CONG., 1sr SEss., WOMEN AND RETIREMENT INCOME PROGRAMS: CURRENT
ISSUES OF EQUITY AND ADEQUACY, REPORT TO SUBCOMM. ON RETIREMENT INCOME & EMPLOY-
MENT OF THE SE.LECF HOUSE COMM. ON AGING 44-45 (Comm. Pub. No. 190, Nov. 1979)
[hereinafter cited as WOMEN AND RETIREMENT INCOME].
Although there is little difference in the average tenure of men and women in the early
years of their careers, beyond the 25-34 age group the tenure of men generally is longer.
See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, NEWS: ONE AMERICAN WORKER IN
TEN HAS BEEN WITH THE SAME EMPLOYER MORE THAN 20 YEARS 1 (1984). In January 1983,
only 22% of women between the ages 35 and 44 had been with their current employer 10
years or more, compared to 42% of men; this was true of 45% of women over 45, com-
pared with 64% of men. Id. at 2, table 1.
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part of the year." The age group that ERISA until recently al-
lowed employers to exclude from coverage-workers under
twenty-five-has traditionally been the one with the highest labor-
force participation rate among women.7 ' Because of patterns such
as these, many women have faced difficulty securing pension
rights in systems that comply with only the minimum ERISA vest-
ing and eligibility requirements."
In addition, ERISA's ostensibly neutral design operated to ad-
versely affect wives and widows. For example, prior to the adop-
tion of the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, ERISA allowed plans
to deny survivor's benefits if an otherwise qualified spouse died
from natural causes within two years of choosing such benefits."6
Further, the survivor's benefits could be withdrawn if a partici-
pant died before reaching age fifty-five.7 Such policies manifested
a view of the pension interest as essentially the exclusive property
of the employee-spouse, denying any interest and contribution of
73. In 1982, 33% of employed adult women held part-time jobs, compared with 15%
of employed adult men. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MONEY INCOME
OF HOUSEHOLDS, FAMILES, AND PERSONS IN THE UNrrD STATES: 1982, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS, SERIEs P-60, No. 142, at 196, table 55 (1984) [hereinafter cited as MONEY INCOME
OF HOUsEHoLDS]. 42% of the women were in wage work 49 weeks or less, compared with
33% of the men. Id. For women between the ages of 25 and 64, the most frequent reason
given for working part-time was "keeping house" (40%); this was the reason given by only
1% of the men. Id. at 200, table 56.
74. In 1974, when ERISA was enacted, 63% of women between ages 20-24 were in
the civilian labor force; this participation rate decreased to 52% between ages 25-34 and
remained low for older age groups. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 17, table 4 (1983). Although this disparity is diminishing,
it still exists. Id.
75. In 1982, 10% of all women 65 years and older were receiving private pensions,
compared with 28% of men in this age group. See MONEY INCOME OF HOUSEHOLDS, supra
note 73, at 172-74. An analysis of 1979 Census Data by the National Commission on Social
Security Reform concluded that women in private industry are less likely than men to be
covered by a pension plan, and that this difference is attributable in large part to the fact
that women are "less likely than men to have met the minimum participation standards
[specified by ERISA]-that is, the women were less likely to be at least age 25, to have
worked at least one year on the job, and to have worked at least 1,000 hours a year."
NAT'L COMM'N ON SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM, PENSION RECEIPT AND PENSION COVERAGE BY
SEX, MEMORANDUM No. 27, at 2 (June 14, 1982). 62% of employed men, as compared with
49% of employed women, satisfied all three of these requirements. Id. at 2, table 3. The
extent to which the ERISA reforms enacted in 1984 will ameliorate this disparity is not yet
known. The need for further reform, however, has already been acknowledged. See Vise,
The Next Pension Bill Could Cost Companies More Money, Washington Post, Nov. 19, 1984, at
22 (Nat'l Weekly Ed.).
76. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(o (1982), amended by Pub. L. No. 98-397, § 103(a).
77. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(b) (1982), amended by Pub. L. No. 98-397, § 103(a).
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the nonemployee-spouse.7 8 Upon widowhood or divorce, the con-
sequences of this view fell most devastatingly on the full-time
homemaker unable to secure adequate independent income pro-
tection from pension plans or social security-in other words,
with uneven adverse impact on women.
C. Employment
Employment-related policies similarly have reflected sex-
based assumptions about wage earners, ignored or denigrated the
role of women in the paid work force, and operated to maintain
sex inequality. As with retirement-income programs, the same at-
titudes that resulted in sex-explicit classifications" also have
shaped the purportedly neutral design of certain employment-re-
lated rules.80
For example, traditional thinking about the role of pregnant
women and mothers in the paid work force has resulted in both
sex-explicit and ostensibly neutral practices. Despite the fact that a
substantial percentage of mothers are in paying jobs8 and despite
the evidence confirming the economic necessity that impels them
into wage work, 2 it is still widely assumed that their attachment
to the work force is inappropriate or unnecessary.8 3 This assump-
78. Other policies similarly disadvantage the non-wage-earning spouse-mostly female
full-time homemakers-by not recognizing their contribution to the acquisition of pension
interests. Since work done in the home traditionally has not been viewed as "real work,"
pensions have not been available to homemakers in their own right. See supra note 6.
Homemakers denied any portion of the pensions credited to the wage-earner's account at
the time of divorce also suffer from a view of the pension interest as the exclusive property
of the wage-earner. See infra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
79. See infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
81. In March 1983, 57.2% of married women with husbands present and children
under 18 were in the paid labor force. Waldman, Labor Force Statistics from a Family Perspec-
tive, 106 MONTHLY LAB. Rxv. 16, 18 (1983). For women maintaining their own families, the
participation rate was 67%. See Johnson & Waldman, Most Women Who Maintain Families
Receive Poor Labor Market Returns, 106 MoNrm.Y LAB. REV. 30 (1983).
82. It has been well documented that the majority of women work because of eco-
nomic need. Two-thirds of all women in the labor force in 1982 were single, widowed,
divorced or separated, or had husbands whose 1981 earnings were less than $15,000.
WOMEN's BuR.Au, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, TwENTY FAcrs ON WOMEN WORKERS (1982).
83. See generally Schafran, Women: Reversing a Decade of Progress, in WHAT REAGAN Is
DOING TO US 162-63, 172 (A. Gartner, C. Greer & F. Reissman eds. 1982). Congress
pointed to the "stereotype that all women are marginal workers" as a target of the Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. V 1981)), amending Title VII to prohibit employment dis-
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tion translates most blatantly into policies expressly denying preg-
nant women disability pay" or other employment benefits and se-
curity. 5 It similarly is at the core of employment policies that
explicitly exclude potentially pregnant women from some jobs"'
and define other jobs as inappropriate for women with children.87
The same assumption, however, also shapes superficially neutral
rules such as those establishing a "limited leave" policy for all em-
ployees,"' denying accumulated sick leave to workers on long-term
leaves of absence, 88 or defining certain jobs as closed to workers
with childrearing responsibilities.9 0 Such policies may adversely af-
fect women as certainly as do practices incorporating sex-explicit
crimination on the basis of pregnancy. See H.R. REP'. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4748, 4754.
84. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 149-50 n.1 (1976) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (disability-benefits plan which fails to cover pregnancy-related disabilities);
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 486-89 (1974) (state disability program excluding certain
disabilities attributable to pregnancy); Massachusetts Elec. Co. v. Massachusetts Comm'n
Against Discrimination, 375 Mass. 160, 168, 375 N.E.2d 1192, 1195, 1198-99 (1978) (com-
prehensive disability plan excluded pregnancy related disabilities: invalidated on statutory
grounds). See also Comment, Geduldig v. Aiello: Pregnancy Classifications and the Definition of
Sex Discrimination, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 441, 442-43, 475-76 (1975).
85. H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4751, 4754. See, e.g., Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 138 (1977) (policy
denying pregnant women sick pay and accumulated seniority: sick-pay provision upheld
and seniority provision invalidated); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 634-
35 (1974) (mandatory maternity leave policy: invalidated). See generally Scales, Toward A
Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L. J. 375, 398-403 (1981); Comment, supra note 84, at 476-
79.
86. See generally Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal
Protection with Employment Opportunity Goals Under Title VII, 69 Gao. L. J. 641, 641-42, 647-
51 (1981).
87. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (policy excluding
mothers but not fathers of preschool children from applying for jobs: invalidated).
88. See, e.g., Abraham v. Graphic Arts Int'l Union, 660 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(employees engaged in project entitled to only ten days' sick leave and ten days' vacation
pay).
89. See, e.g., School Comm. of Braintree v. Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination, 377
Mass. 424, 425, 386 N.E.2d 1251, 1252 (1979) (invalidating such a plan on statutory
grounds).
90. See Taub, Book Review, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1686, 1690 (1980) (reviewing C.
MACKINNON, SExuAL HARAssMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEx DISCRIMINATION
(1979)). Even without explicit exclusionary rules for childrearers, labor market barriers to
combining wage work with parenting are substantial. These barriers include inflexible
work schedules, sick leave policies and vacation benefits which do not accommodate depen-
dents' needs, limited part-time employment opportunities, and the denial of benefits to
those who are employed part-time. See Frug, Securing Job Equality for Women: Labor Market
Hostility to Working Mothers, 59 B.U.L. REv. 55, 56-61, 95-103 (1979).
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terms. For example, lack of an adequate leave policy has been de-
scribed as tantamount to a policy of dismissal for pregnant em-
ployees "portend[ing] a drastic effect on women employees of
childbearing age-an impact no male would ever encounter." 1
Other ostensibly neutral workplace rules are firmly anchored
in the same sexual stereotypes that traditionally translated into
sex-segregated job classifications. Stereotypes that produce rules
explicitly excluding females from certain jobs can be and some-
times are translated into purportedly neutral eligibility standards
which effectively accomplish the same discrimination. For exam-
ple, one city abandoned sex-segregated job classifications in its po-
lice department and established instead purportedly neutral physi-
cal eligibility requirements. 2  The ostensibly neutral
requirements, however, were designed on the untested assump-
tion that a male physique was needed for certain positions; in ef-
fect, this assumption operated to restrict severely the percentage
of female employees, essentially mirroring the sex-segregated job
structure that existed before."8
Veterans-preference schemes which effectively make veteran
status a requirement for entry and promotion in government jobs
present another example of ostensibly neutral rules that may serve
to maintain a sex-segregated job structure in which women are
locked into traditionally female positions." As long as the oppor-
91. Abraham v. Graphic Arts Int'l Union, 660 F.2d at 819. Accord, 29 C.F.R. §
1604.10(c) (1983) (EEOC guidelines). See also Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. at 140-
42. Ostensibly neutral rules also may disadvanage workers with childrearing responsibili-
ties. See supra note 90.
92. See Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
928 (1979).
93. Id. at 1371 (applicants for police officer positions were required to be of a mini-
mum height and to be able to pass certain physical abilities tests). See also Dothard v. Rawl-
inson, 433 U.S. 321, 329-33 (1977) (Alabama's statutory height and weight requirements
for prison guards eliminated 41.13% of female population). Another example of a facially
neutral eligibility requirement that operates to perpetuate the exclusion of women from
traditionally male jobs is the insistence on prior experience in such work. See Kilgo v. Bow-
man Transp., Inc., 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1451 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (prior experience
requirement for over-the-road truck drivers: invalidated). Seniority rules for promotion
and job retention also serve to disadvantage women when they are applied to jobs that in
the past were held only by men. See U.S. ComM'N oN CrvmI RIGHTS, AFFRMATIvE AcroN iN
THE 1980's: DISMANT.ING THE PiocEss oF DISCRIMINATION (1981).
94. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 283-85 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing); see infra notes 206-25 and accompanying text.
1984]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
tunities for women to become veterans continue to be limited,95
few females can meet this job requirement. The explicit sexual
classifications historically appearing throughout veterans-prefer-
ence statutes96 suggest that legislative decisionmakers frequently
acted on the assumption that the veterans for whom such prefer-
ence was appropriate would be men who had women dependent
upon them for support. 7 Indifference to the detrimental effect
veterans-preference programs would have on the status of women
in public jobs comports with such assumptions.
Purportedly neutral compensation practices also may reflect
sex-based judgments and operate to discount women's wages in
the same way as do practices explicitly differentiating in terms of
sex. For example, one sex-explicit provision ruled unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court in the 1970's granted increased housing
and medical allowance to all married males employed by the mili-
tary, but only to married females who could prove that their hus-
bands were financially dependent upon them.98 Rejecting this dis-
parate compensation, Justice Brennan explained that it could not
be justified by the government's claim that "wives in our society
frequently are dependent upon their husbands, while husbands
rarely are dependent on their wives."" Given the disparity be-
95. See generally Goodman, Women, War and Equality: An Examination of Sex Discrimina-
don in the Militaty, 5 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 243 (1979).
96. See J. Wxuzmz, WOMEN VRm.s 168-96 (1983). Women in the military have not
always been included within the definition of "veterans." Id. at 168-79. Even after this
problem was remedied, female veterans sometimes found themselves with fewer benefits
than those granted male veterans. For example, a married woman veteran was denied cer-
tain federal educational benefits granted to married male veterans, and her surviving
spouse received benefits only upon proof of financial dependency; such dependency restric-
tions did not apply to the surviving spouse of a male veteran. Id. at 193-94. Explicit gender
distinctions still found in veterans' programs include the federal provision which grants an
employment preference to mothers but not to fathers of a deceased veteran. 5 U.S.C. §§
2108(3)(f), (g) (1982). In addition, even when statutes do not contain explicit sex-based
benefit restrictions, practices have diminished the benefits available to female veterans. For
example, by ignoring female veterans in the design of health-care programs, the Veterans
Administration has not provided needed medical services to these women. See Wiu.Nz,
supra, at 180-93.
97. Indeed, one state even explicitly excluded traditionally female jobs from the pref-
erence scheme. See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 266 n.14 (exempting applicant lists for women's jobs
from Massachusetts veterans-preference law from 1919 to 1971). See also id. at 285 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
98. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 678-79 (1973).
99. Id. at 688-89.
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tween the respective average wages of women and men,100 how-
ever, a compensation rule that imposes a dependency test upon
both sexes is just as likely to result in lower compensation for fe-
male employees.101 Although such a rule appears to be facially
neutral, the underlying view that a "primary wage earner" test is
appropriate is anchored in the familiar stereotype of marriage as a
relationship in which one spouse is the breadwinner and the other
the dependent. This view fails to perceive the possibility that the
wages of both the husband and wife can be important.102 The con-
sequence of establishing a primary-wage-earner test in determin-
ing compensation is to exaggerate the income gap by reducing
even further the wages paid to women.103
Finally, unemployment policies also disadvantage women in
the paid work force. In some instances, unemployment programs
have incorporated explicit sex-based distinctions detrimental to
women.101 In other programs, ostensibly neutral unemployment
100. See supra note 6.
101. See Wambheim v. J.C. Penney Co., 642 F.2d 362, 364 (9th Cir. 1983) (limiting
dependent medical coverage to married employees who earn more than 50% of the com-
bined income of the spouses denies coverage to 63% of the female employees, and only 5%
of the male employees; this purportedly neutral rule replaced one which explicitly provided
dependent coverage to male employees only; on remand, the district court judge held that
the employer had established a business justification for its head-of-household rule and that
the rule was not a pretext for discrimination). Affd, 705 F.2d 1494 (1983), cert. denied, 52
U.S.L.W. 3904 (June 6, 1984).
102. In 1981 more than three-fifths of all married couples had two incomes, with an
average annual income of $28,650. See generally BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERcE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS (SPECIA. STUDIEs), SER]ES P-23, No. 133, EARNINGS iN
1981 OF MAuumD-CoupLE FAMniU., By SELEcET CHARAcrERmSncs OF HuSBANDS AND WivES
(1984). A recent analysis of this data concludes that without the aggregate earnings of both
spouses, the families would have "suffered substantial declines in real income" in the
1970's. See Two-Income Families on the Rise, U.S. Says, N.Y. Times, April 5, 1984, at C7, col.
1. The presence of two wage earners provides a critical cushion for some families in the
event one worker becomes unemployed. See Klein, Trends in Employment and Unemployment
in Families, 106 MoNrHLY LAB. REv. 21, 22-24 (1983). See also Blumberg, supra note 43, at
240 n.29.
103. Facially neutral pay scales also may disadvantage women by paying employees in
predominantly female job classifications less than employees in predominantly male jobs
involving similar responsibilities, judgments, knowledge, skills and working conditions.
AFSCME v. State of Washington, 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 808, 819-20 (D.C. Wash.
1983) (20% disparity in wages paid to jobholders in predominantly female job classifica-
tions in Washington state government). See generally NATIONAL AcADEMY OF SCIENCES,
WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES: EQUAL PAY FOR JOBS OF EQUAL VALUE (1981); Blumrosen, Wage
Discrimination, Job Segregation and Title VII of the Civil Rights Ac of 1964, 12 U. MICn. J.L.
REF. 397, 428-57 (1979).
104. See, e.g., Turner v. Dep't of Employment Security of Utah, 423 U.S. 44 (1975)
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provisions center their "adverse effect on female claimants ' 10 5
without drawing explicit sex lines. One example of the latter is a
rule denying unemployment compensation to non-primary wage
earners who leave jobs because of their marital or domestic duties
or to accompany their spouses to a new residenc .108 The classifi-
cation lines here distinguish between those who leave jobs for do-
mestic reasons and those who leave for other reasons, and be-
tween those providing secondary as opposed to primary family
support. While neither of these is a sex-distinction per se, a famil-
iar picture emerges when they are considered in light of the many
conditions that cast wage-working wives in the role of secondary
breadwinners and that "impel working wives, rather than working
husbands, to leave work for family reasons. ' 107 These facially neu-
tral rules convey a common message about the distinction be-
tween spouses who are responsible for the "domestic duty" role,
and those responsible for providing "financial support."
If such assumptions about financial dependency in marriages
were rejected, and women's participation in the paid work force
were understood as necessary rather than denigrated as ancil-
lary,108 employment policies more likely would be designed with
the needs of female, as well as male, workers in mind.109 The ben-
efits of this more inclusive view would be felt by men and women
alike. 110
(unemployment program that disqualified pregnant women from collecting benefits for 12
weeks prior to the estimated due date, and until 6 weeks after giving birth: invalidated).
105. Boren v. California Dep't of Employment Dev., 59 Cal. App. 3d 250, 258, 130
Cal. Rptr. 683, 688 (1976).
106. See id. See also IDAHo CODE § 72-1366(c) (Supp. 1982). Another example is Con.
gress's consideration of jobs bills which ignore the fact that women are among the unem-
ployed. See Goodman, Women also need ajob bill, Boston Globe, Dec. 23, 1982, at 15, col. 1.
107. Boren, 59 Cal. App. 3d at 257, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 687. The California appellate
court invalidated this unemployment provision after subjecting it to strict constitutional
scrutiny. Id. at 259-61, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 688-90. But see Gilman v. Unemployment Com-
pensation Bd. of Review, 28 Pa. Commw. 630, 369 A.2d 895 (1977) (upholding a similar
provision; Boren was distinguished on the ground that plaintiffs had not shown as pro-
nounced an adverse impact on women).
108. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
109. See Powers, Sex Segregation and the Ambivalent Directions of Sex Discrimination Law,
29 Wis. L. REV. 55, 106-10 (1979). For a discussion of reforms which would address labor
market hostility to females, see Frug, supra note 90, at 45-102.
110. The lack of flexibility to combine wage-earning and family-caring activities has
restricted men as well as women. See Williams, supra note 20, at 196-200.
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D. Marriage and Divorce
There has been considerable reform of domestic relations
laws that were rooted in the views that upon marriage "the very
being or legal existence of the woman is suspended. . . or at least
is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband" ' and
that the marriage relationship is an exchange of financial support
by the husband for domestic and conjugal services by the wife.112
Nevertheless, significant remnants of such laws continue in our le-
gal system undisturbed. In addition to the laws that still expressly
authorize male dominance,118 other rules which on the surface
suggest neutrality appear on closer examination to echo the same
sex-based assumptions. 4 Moreover, they operate to reinforce the
economic dependence that has been an essential part of women's
continued subordination.1 5
Laws and practices concerning divorce illustrate how attitudes
about females and males have shaped ostensibly neutral provisions
that derogate the economic status of women.""' As a result of leg-
islative reform1 7 and a recent Supreme Court decision applying
S1I1. 1 BLACEStONE, ComwrARxEs *445.
112. B. BRowN, A. FREEDMAN, H. KxAz & A. PRicE, WoMEN's R HTs AND THm LAw:
THE IMPACT OF TEm ERA ON STATE LAWS 97-207 (1977) [hereinafter cited as B. BRowN]; L.
WErITMAN, THE MARRIAGE CoNTRACr 1-224 (1981); Johnston, Sex and Property: The Common
Law Tradition, the Law School, and Developments Toward Equality, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1033,
1061-89 (1972); Schultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State Polity, 70
CAL L. REv. 204 (1982). For a fresh reconstruction of the motivation behind the early
married women's property laws, see Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 1800-1852, 71
GEo. L.J. 1359 (1983).
113. See, e.g., GA. CODE § 8548 (1978) (rebuttable presumption that husband owns all
of real property); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 2 (West 1976) (husband is recognized as
"head of the family"); Wmsc. STAT. ANN. § 766.05 (West 1980) (if a woman works for her
husband, her work is presumed to be gratuitous). In Alabama, the father but not the
mother can recover damages from someone who injures their child. See Thorne v. Odom,
349 So. 2d 1126 (Ala. 1977).
114. See, e.g., Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 621-22, 351 N.E.2d 526, 528 (1976)
(same assumptions "concerning the role and status of women in marriage and society"
which resulted in explicit sex-based marriage laws also "animated and gave support to the
common law rule of interspousal immunity"). See also infra notes 120-34 and accompanying
text.
115. See generally L. WEITErmA, supra note 27, at 79-80; Krauskopf, Partnership Mar-
riage: Legal Reforms Needed, in WoMEN INTo WIVEs 93, 105-08 (J.R. Chapman & M. Gates
eds. 1977); Johnston, supra note 112, at 1069-90.
116. See infra text accompanying notes 120-34.
117. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 504 (1980); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16 § 3 (1976);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-7 (1978).
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the equal protection clause,118 alimony laws are now framed in
gender-neutral terms: alimony must be awardable to all "depen-
dent spouses" not just to "wives." However, this reform has not
changed the practice of discounting the claims of financially de-
pendent women by failing to recognize their economic needs or
the value and consequences of their non-financial homemaking
contribution to the marriage."' One example is the general rule
applied in states such as Arizona, where courts use a spousal-main-
tenance standard of approximately one-third of the paying
spouse's net income. 20 The relationship between this artificial
guideline-bearing no correlation to need or ability to pay-and
the view of women as subordinate was recognized by the Pennsyl-
vania judge who described such a rule as reflecting "an ingrained
sexist philosophy whereby a man's labor for money was somehow
thought to be more valuable than a woman's work as a home-
maker."1 21 This jurist further criticized the rule as treating
women "like a used piece of merchandise.112 2 The fact that the
one-third rule, in states where it still applies, now puts a cap on
alimony awards to men and women alike obscures, rather than
eliminates, the problem. By limiting the dependent spouse to "an
artificial one-third of the other spouse's net earnings, regardless
of their respective needs,"123 this ostensibly neutral rule operates
most often to disadvantage the woman whose time spent as a
homemaker prevents her from developing any independent eco-
nomic security. 24
Similarly, child support awards that do not adequately ac-
count for the costs of rearing a child, particularly the nonfinancial
118. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
119. See generally Note, Equity and Economics: A Case For Spousal Support, 8 GOLDEN
GATE L. REv. 443, 451-69, 477 (1979). Data collected by the United States Census Bureau
confirms that only 15% of the 17 million ever-divorced or currently separated women as of
spring 1982 were awarded alimony. See BURAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DP'T OF COMMERCE,
CmiD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY 2 (1983). Only 43% of the women due alimony payments in
1981 received a full payment and the mean amount that was received was only $3000. Id.
120. For example, guidelines published by the Domestic Relations Division of the
Maricopa County (Ariz.) Superior Court target maintenance awards at between one-fourth
to one-third of the payor's net income. See [Reference file] FAM. L. REP'. (BNA) 513:0005
(Feb. 27, 1979).
121. Holmes v. Holmes, 127 Prrrs. LEGA. J. 196, 197 (Ct. Common Pleas 1978).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. See generally L. WErrzAN, supra note 27, at 74-80.
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contribution of custodial care, and the lack of effective support
enforcement mechanisms, result in imposing disproportionately
large child support costs on the custodial parent.125 Although such
standards are applied to all parents, they reflect the familiar fail-
ure to place an economic value on the role females traditionally
are expected to play in marriage.1 26 They operate most often to
disadvantage women, since mothers are most frequently in the
custodial parent role.12 7
Ostensibly neutral laws concerning marital property manifest
a similar pattern. A marital-property system that emphasizes indi-
vidual ownership of individually acquired property is facially neu-
tral, but when implemented in the actual context of marriage rela-
tionships in which women either do not do wage work, or do wage
work but are undercompensated for it, the neutrality is illusory.12 8
Because of sex discrimination in employment, and the "traditional
structure of marriage [where] ...husbands, for the most part,
acquire property while their wives, who care for the family and
refrain from vigorous pursuit of employment outside the home,
do not," '29 the emphasis on individual ownership results in "gross
unfairness to numerous married women.'1 30 Such systems either
do not take into account or, at best, minimize the significance of,
domestic contributions in determining the ownership of property
during marriage,13 1 the economic settlement at divorce, 32 and the
125. See Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Propery,
Alimony and Child Support, 28 UCLA L. REv. 1181, 1233-41 (1981). See also Bruch, Child
Support, 16 U.C.D. L. REv. 49, 54 (1982); Hunter, Child Support Law and Policy: The System-
atic Imposition of Costs on Women, 6 HARv. WomEN's L.J. 1 (1983).
126. Cf. Krauskopf, supra note 115, at 102; Weitzman, supra note 125, at 1236-37.
The absence of effective legal remedies to enforce child support obligations has been
traced to the relegation of women to the private sphere. See Hunter, supra note 125, at 18-
19; Powers, supra note 109, at 77-79.
127. A frequently cited statistic is that "90% of all children of divorce are in the cus-
tody of the their mothers." Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used
in Child Custody Determinations, 7 WoMEN's Rrs. L. REP. 235, 236 (1982). While this often is
pointed to as evidence that the legal system discriminates against men, studies confirm that
when fathers seek custody, their chances of being awarded custody are substantial, perhaps
equal to or better than 50%. Id. at 236-37.
128. Prager, Sharing Principles and the Future of Marital Property Law, 25 UCLA L. REv.
1, 2-3 (1977).
129. Id. at 2.
130. Id.
131. For example, in New York, each spouse has the exclusive right during the mar-
riage to control and dispose of personal property titled in such spouse's name and the
income it earns. See N.Y. GEN. OB aG. LAw § 3-311(2) (McKinney 1978). This often leaves
1984)
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distribution of property upon the death of a spouse.18 3 Marital-
property systems that stress limited sharing principles mitigate
these problems, but do not eliminate them.'"
Although framed in terms that are facially neutral, such do-
mestic relations laws produce results that are too consistently dis-
criminatory to be considered random. Thus, an examination of
the economic status of men and women after divorce shatters the
widely believed myth that divorce serves to depress the economic
position of both; in fact, studies demonstrate that men typically
experience an improvement in the post-divorce standard of living
while women experience a steep decline." 5
E. Welfare Programs
Finally, the presence of sex bias is evident in purportedly neu-
tral national welfare programs. Welfare programs that are gener-
ally targeted to remedy the causes of male poverty 36 effectively
the woman who is a full-time homemaker with no property or income over which she has
control. As a consequence, she is unable to obtain credit in her own name and has no
property to will to her heirs. See Bruch, Of Work, Family Wealth and Equality, 17 FAM. L.Q.
99, 103 (1983).
132. See Note, Equitable Distribution vs. Fixed Rules Marital Property Reform and the Uni-
form Marital Property Act, 23 B.C.L. Rav. 761, 764-67 (1982) (describing the separate-prop-
erty system). Recent reforms have greatly reduced the number of jurisdictions which to-
tally ignore homemaker contributions in determining the ownership of property at
divorce. See generally id. at 761-63; Bruch, supra note 131, at 101-02. Cf infra note 267 and
accompanying text.
133. Equal Rights Amendment: Hearings on H.R.J. Res. I Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Comm., 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (testimony of
Ann Freedman, at 11-13); L. WarrzMAN, supra note 27, at 36-39.
134. See, e.g., Prager, The Persistence of Separate Property Concepts in California's Commu-
nity Property System, 1849-1975, 24 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1976). Limited definitions of marital
assets in community-property systems, as in individual-property systems, may operate to
exclude a significant portion of a couple's assets from the sharing principle. Weitzman,
supra note 125, at 1210-21, 1246-65 (career assets at the time of divorce are not recog-
nized as community property in California). This is true of pensions in some states, such as
the separate-property system in North Carolina. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(2) (1983 Cum.
Supp.) (non-vested pension and retirement funds defined as separate property). See also His-
quierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979) (Federal Railroad Retirement Benefits cannot
be divided at time of divorce).
135. See, e.g., Weitzman, supra note 125, at 1241-48 (men in the California sample
studied experienced a 42% increase in their standard of living after divorce while women
experienced a 75% decrease), 1249-50 (Michigan study indicating similar disparity).
136. See generally D. PEAacE & H. McAnoo, WOMEN AND CHILDREN: ALONE AND IN POV-
aRTY (1981); Pearldaughter & Schneider, Women and Welfare: The Cycle of Female Poverty, 10
GOLDEN GATE U.L. Rav. 1043 (1980).
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operate to ignore or actively reinforce the causes of female pov-
erty, and to maintain female subordination. For example, since its
inception in 1935, the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) program has reflected stereotypic notions of appropriate
male and female roles. 87 Such assumptions translated most bla-
tantly into explicit sex-based provisions such as those preferring
low-income males over low-income females for job placement,"8
or treating two-parent families deprived of a father's wages as eli-
gible for aid while denying aid to families that became needy be-
cause the mother lost her job. 8 The same assumptions about the
sexes are at the center of facially neutral practices that systemati-
cally disfavor women. 40
While factors causing male and female poverty are alike in
many respects, males do not share to the same extent all of the
problems forcing women (and children in women-headed house-
holds) to live at or below the poverty line. Among the problems
more seriously affecting women are those resulting from physical
burdens and complications of childbearing,' 4' primary responsibil-
ity for childrearing,14 2 lack of socialization to roles of primary
financial responsibility in either employment or family life, 148 sex-
biased consequences of divorce or widowhood,'" sex-based em-
ployment barriers and practices,"4 5 and limited access to public
137. See Law, supra note 27, at 1254-55.
138. 42 U.S.C. § 633(a) (1982). See Law, supra note 27, at 1286-94.
139. See Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 78, 85 (1979) (such a program cannot
survive scrutiny under due process clause of fifth amendment because the gender classifica-
tion is not substantially related to valid statutory goals).
140. See Law, supra note 27, at 1280. See also notes 149-54 and accompanying text.
141. See U.S. Crv. RIGHTs COMM'N, A GROWING CRISIS: DISADVANTAGED WOMEN AND
THEI CHILDREN 48-61 (1983) [hereinafter cited as A GROWING CRISIS].
142. See id. at 5-14; Pearldaughter & Schneider, supra note 136, at 1054-55. See gener-
ally J. BERNARD, THE FUTURE OF MOTHERHOOD (1974); N. CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION
Or MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER (1978).
143. Society traditionally has viewed women's primary role as that of being an eco-
nomically dependent wife and mother. Pearldaughter & Schneider, supra note 136, at 1046
& n.16. With 53% of women in the paid labor force today, and many fully employed
women who head households in poverty despite their work efforts, this dependency will not
disappear soon. Id. at 1085. See A GROWING CRISIS, supra note 141, at 15.
144. See supra notes 111-35 and accompanying text. See also Pearldaughter & Schnei-
der, supra note 136, at 1049-51, 1064-67.
145. See supra notes 79-110 and accompanying text; A GROWING CRISIS, supra note
141, at 15-35. See also supra note 6. See generally A. KEssLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HIS-
TORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES (1982); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT: GUARANTEEING EQuAL RIGHTS FOR WOMEN UNDER
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and private income-replacement insurance. 14  These problems
contribute to making marital and parental status, rather than la-
bor-market status, a key indicator of economic well-being for
women.147 Accordingly, although the primary cause of poverty for
men-joblessness-also is a problem for women, a program that
denigrates parental responsiblities and targets "jobs" alone is not
sufficient to interrupt the cycle of poverty which is entrapping an
increasing number of women each year.14 8
Nevertheless, ostensibly neutral welfare programs either ig-
nore or (more perversely) actively reinforce the causes of female
poverty. Work training and government job placement compo-
nents of welfare programs, for example, do not attempt to reverse
the concentration of women in low-paying, traditionally female
wage-work positions or the systematic devaluation of such jobs.149
In addition, welfare is conditioned on wage-work requirements es-
tablished without regard to the unpaid work required to rear chil-
dren and maintain a home, or to the availability of essential sup-
portive services such as child care.1 50 Furthermore, a comparison
between welfare programs serving primarily women and chil-
dren 51 and other federal income-maintenance programs which
serve a more sexually integrated population,152 reveals a "double
standard" that sytematically disfavors women and children5 as to
level of grant provided and to the conditions that are attached. 1 4
THE CoNsTrruToN 6-9 (1981).
146. See supra text accompanying notes 43-78.
147. See A GROWING CRisS, supra note 141, at 5-14. Men, on the other hand, generally
do not become poor because of divorce. See Weitzman, supra note 125, at 1241-60.
148. See supra note 6. The number and percentage of women who are poor is increas-
ing even as the number and percentage of the general population considered impoverished
decreases. See Pearldaughter & Schneider, supra note 136, at 1045 n.1 1.
149. See'Law, supra note 27, at 1294-310; See also U.S. COM'N ON CIvIt RIGHTS,
WOMEN STILL IN PoVERTY (1970) (describing the effects of the welfare system, job-training
programs, employment discrimination and child-care availability on women's poverty);
Pearldaughter & Schneider, supra note 136, at 1063.
150. See A GROWING CRiIss, supra note 109, at 63. See generally Law, supra note 27.
151. See Law, supra note 27, at 1256 n.21.
152. See id. at 1325 (drawing a comparison between AFDC and programs providing
aid to the unemployed, disabled, and the aged). Professor Law concludes not that these
programs are adequate, but that "programs for women are worse." Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1325-28. See also CoALTroN ON WOMEN AND THE BUDGET, INEQUALITY OF
SACRmIcE THE IMPACT OF THE REAGAN BUDGET ON WOMEN (1984).
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In sum, even when public policy is enacted in neutrally
phrased legislation and executed through ostensibly neutral prac-
tices, such actions are not necessarily free from sexual bias and
may result in significant sex-based harm. Such governmental con-
duct is predicated upon assumptions that women are not serious
members of the paid labor force, that women's wages and income
security are of little importance, that the work women do in the
home has no economic value, and that the work women tradition-
ally perform in the paid work force is of less value than work tra-
ditionally performed by men. The cumulative effect of actions
rooted in these assumptions is to legitimize and reinforce women's
dependency upon men. Moreover, the effect of such assumptions
is difficult to distinguish from that of sex-explicit generalizations.
It is hardly surprising that the same views that have shaped
policies and practices incorporating sex-explicit classifications also
influence and may deform ostensibly neutral action. Since the vast
majority of official decisionmakers in this society have been
men, 55 policies and practices have developed that are based
largely on male needs, experiences, and perceptions., The im-
pact upon women of such policies and practices has remained es-
sentially unexamined.L57 Indeed, much of public life has been
designed on the expectation that the participants in that sphere of
activity will be men.1 58
155. Women continue to be severely underrepresented in this nation's law-making
bodies. In 1982, women held only 4% of the seats in the United States Congress; 13% of
state-wide elective offices; 13% of the seats in state legislatures. CENTER FOR THE AMERICAN
WOMAN AND PoLmcs, EAGLETON INSTITUTE OF PoLrrIcs, FACT SHEET (1982). In 1981, the
latest year for which complete figures are available, women held 9% of all elective offices
across the country. Id. The participation rate of women in the judiciary is even lower. In
1980, only 5.4% of all federal judges, and 3% of state trial and appellate court judges, were
women. Wikler, On the Judicial Agenda for the 80's: Equal Treatment for Men and Women in the
Courts, 64 JuDicATuR 202, 209 n.32 (1980).
156. See Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts and Feminism, 7
WoMEN's RTs. L. REP. 175, n.2 (1982). See also Johnston & Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law:
A Study inJudicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 675, 741-46 (1971) (discussing reasons why
predominantly male judiciary has difficulty perceiving harmful effects of sex dis-
crimination).
157. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
158. See Freedman, supra note 6, at 947-49 (1983); Note, Toward a Redefinition of Sex-
ual Equality, 95 HARv. L. Rxv. 486, 487-88 (1981). The reverse side of this coin is also true:
policies concerning the traditional female sphere of domestic family life are designed with
only women in mind. See He, She and It. Invisible Men, Boston Globe, Sept. 8, 1983, at 22,
col. 1.
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Sociologist Georg Simmel's 1911 work, Philosophische Kultur,
described how male-defined norms and values claim validity as "a
yardstick of truth and justice for both men and women in a male-
dominated society." 159 His analysis offers important insight into
the pervasiveness of this process:
We measure the achievements and the commitments ... of males and fe-
males in terms of specific norms and values; but these norms are not neutral,
standing above the contrasts of the sexes; they have themselves a male char-
acter .... [T]he general mores and the specific social ideas, the equity of
practical judgments and the objectivity of theoretical knowledge . . . all
these categories are formally generically human, but are in fact masculine in
terms of their actual historical formation. If we call ideas that claim absolute
validity objectively binding, then it is a fact that in the historical life of our
species there operates the equation: objective equals male. 10
Scholars from a wide variety of disciplines are discovering
that doctrines which have long been accepted as "objective" are
in fact male-centered and often operate to the detriment of
women."' Psychologist Carol Gilligan, for example, recently doc-
159. GEORG SneaL, PmLOsoPmcHn KuLTU (1911), quoted in Coser, Georg Simmel's Ne-
glected Contributions to the Sociology of Women, 2 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOc'Y 869,
872 (1977).
160. Coser, supra note 159, at 873.
161. See, e.g. C. GILLIGAN , IN A DaTIRErT Voi c PsYc oEGocAL THEoRY AND WOMEN'S
DEvELmrENT (1982) (moral development theorists from psychologists Freud and Piaget to
Erikson and Kohlberg have equated typically male forms of maturation with general human
maturity, and labeled female forms of development as atrophied); G. LERNER, THE MAJOR-
rr FINis I-s PAST: PLACING WOMEN IN HisroRY 145-59 (1979) ("all conceptual models of
history hitherto developed have only limited usefulness for women's history, since all are
based on the assumptions of a patriarchal ordering of values"); C. MCMI±AN, WOMEN,
REASON AN NATURE SoME PHILOsoPmcAL PRoBLEMS wITH FEMINISM (1982) (paradigms of
reason have been defined by masculine modes of abstract cognition and analytic logic); S.
OlIN, WOMEN IN WESzRN PoLrnc. THOUGHT (1979) (examining the treatment of women
in political philosophy to determine whether the existing tradition can sustain the inclusion
of women); R. RnuTHER, SEXtsM AND GOD TALx: TowARD A FEMiNST THEOLOGY (1983) (sex-
based perspectives in religion). See also Degler, Women Approach History Differently and Men
Must Understand the Diference, Chron. of Higher Educ., Sept. 15, 1983, at 56 ("[i]f the new
history of women tells us anything, it is that our generally accepted conception of the past
has been derived from the interests of men... [; men] did not exclude or ignore women
because they were misogynists or malicious; they did so because what women did, felt, or
thought was not important to them when they looked to the past for guidance, understand-
ing and identity"); ANoTHER VoIEc: F ms PERsPErTrvEs ON SOCIAL LIFE AND SOCIAL Sci-
ENcE (M. Millman & R. Moss Kanter eds. 1975) (collection of twelve essays examining how
"social science has been defined by models representing a world dominated by white males,
and so our studies of the social world have been limited by the particular interests, perspec-
tives, and experiences of that one group"); Moulton, The Myth of the Neutral "Man", in
FEMmsM mAND PILosoPHY 124 (Vetterling-Braggin, Elliston & English eds. 1977) (examin-
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umented the repeated exclusion of women as the subjects of stud-
ies upon which theories of psychological development have been
based.16 2 Dr. Gilligan demonstrated that the application of these
theories to women has supported conclusions that there are
problems in women's development.163 By exposing the disparity be-
tween women's experience and the models of human growth built
exclusively from male subjects, Gilligan's analysis suggests that the
problem may be with the model, rather than the women who do
not fit within it.1 '
Government policies fashioned after sex-defined models pre-
sent a similar problem. A facile acceptance of the neutrality label
operates to legitimize a system that requires women to meet the
"neutral" (read: "male") standard or to accept a subordinate
place. 5 Where so-called neutrality is constructed from the per-
spective of male dominance, 66 insisting merely on facially neutral
standards is inevitably insufficient to eliminate sex inequality.
There is nothing "equal" in the opportunity of males and females
to satisfy such standards.1 67
ing the sex-biased nature of the pronoun "he").
162. C. GH=GAN, supra note 161, at 1-23.
163. Id. at 1-2, 18-22.
164. Id. at 2.
165. See MacKinnon, supra note 42, at 635, 636-40.
166. See C. MAcKINNON, supra note 21, at 123-25; MacKinnon, supra note 42, at 636-
40.
167. There is mounting criticism of the notions that sexual equality means the inte-
gration of women into a male-defined world and that legal equality is merely formal equal-
ity. See, e.g., C. MAcKnNON, supra note 21, at 123-27; Scales, supra note 85, at 427-30;
Powers, supra note 109, at 89-100; Williams, supra note 20, at 197-200. See also A. DwoR-
KiN, OUR BLOOD: PRoPHEsiEs AND Discouasas OF SEXUAL PorMzcs 11-12 (1976); Barber, Be-
yond the Feminist Mystique, THE Naw REPUBLTc, July 11, 1983, at 26, 30-32. Varying views on
whether it is inevitable that male experience and the male norm will continue to define
neutrality, however, result in different approaches to overcome this problem. The view
that this result is inevitable, for example, leads to seeing the development of a separate set
of rules and policies as essential to accommodate female needs and experiences, particu-
larly with respect to childbearing. See, e.g., Krieger & Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy:
Equal Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE L. REv.
513, 536-64 (1983); Scales, supra note 85, at 432. Some advocate such separate treatment
for the even wider range of women's childrearing and other normative roles as well. See E.
WoLGA ST, E uArrY AND THm RIGHTS OF WOMEN 14-16, 121-58. For a careful analysis of the
risks presented by the separate-treatment approach, see Williams, supra note 20, at 190-
200. See also Taub, supra note 90, at 1686, 1690-95. Cf infra note 175.
A contrasting premise is that it is possible to develop inclusive policies and practices
which embrace female as well as male experience. Cf Williams, supra note 20, at 195
n.1 10. This is without doubt a difficult undertaking: even once the conception of sexual
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II. FACIAL NEUTRALITY UNDER THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Despite the significant similarities that exist between sex-ex-
plicit classifications and some ostensibly neutral rules, these two
forms of governmental regulation are accorded decisively differ-
ent levels of scrutiny under the federal equal protection clause.
This constitutional provision has only recently been interpreted to
limit the situations in which government may expressly define an
individual's rights or responsibilities on the basis of sex.1"8 Even
today, however, official decisionmakers have a free hand to main-
tain sex inequality, provided their actions are presented in an os-
tensibly neutral form and the resulting harm cannot be traced to a
discriminatory purpose.
The mandate of equality in the equal protection clause re-
quires that individuals not be denied the "equal protection of the
laws." 16 This command has been interpreted by the judiciary to
require that individuals who are alike be treated alike.1 70 For most
equality evolves to firmly reject pseudoneutral rules, unraveling male-centered neutrality
and finding more inclusive standards will not be easy. See, e.g., MacKinnon, Book Review,
34 STAN. L. REv. 703, 725-34 (1982). The difficulties are most acute in the context of
judicial remedy because of the blunt tools generally available to courts; legislative, execu-
tive, and administrative government decisionmakers have far greater flexibility in design-
ing and revising policies. The difficulty of the task should not deter us from accepting this
challenge, however, or encourage us to ignore the lesson of history that reinforcing sepa-
rate treatment of the sexes serves to maintain sex segregation and the subordination of
women. The search for a neutrality which is not rooted in male dominance envisions in-
stead a society in which laws, policies, and practices are defined by and for females as well
as males, and to accommodate what has traditionally been female, as well as male, experi-
ence. An example of such neutrality would be structuring salaried work on the assumption
that employees may have parenting and other family-care responsibilities instead of the
assumption now dominant in the workplace that wage earners have wives at home to care
for them. See supra notes 83, 108-10 and accompanying text.
168. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (discussed infra note 173).
169. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
170. The equal protection clause has been interpreted to stand for the general princi-
ple that government must act in an even-handed way: any distinctions the state draws in its
treatment of people must rest on "some ground of difference having a. . .relation to the
object" of the government's action. If there is no relevant ground of difference, individuals
are considered to be alike or "similarly situated," Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S.
412, 415 (1920), and government is seen as acting impermissibly if it does not treat them
similarly. See Tussman & TenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341,
344 (1949). See also Baker, Neutrality, Process, and Rationality: Flawed Interpretations of Equal
Protection, 58 Tax. L. REv. 1029 (1980).
The conception of equality as the principle that "likes should be treated alike" reaches
back through the history of Western political thought. An early expression of this concep-
tion is found in the writing of Aristotle, who described "equality in morals" to mean:
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of American history, the view that the sexes essentially are not
alike 71 predetermined the conclusion that government could
treat men and women differently without violating any constitu-
tional requirement of equality; even the most overt ways that laws
and official practices pigeonholed the sexes into distinct roles and
subordinated women survived judicial scrutiny. 17 2
It was not until 1971 that the Supreme Court first ruled that
the equal protection clause places some limits on government's
freedom to treat women and men differently."' Since then, the
"things that are alike should be treated alike, while things that are unalike should be
treated unalike in proportion to their unalikeness." See Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality,
95 HAxv. L. REv. 537, 542-43 (1983).
171. This view finds roots in Aristotle, too. See S. OiNs, WOMEN N WESTERT PoLrrMcA.
THOUGHT 73-96 (1979). Aristotle, and other "egalitarian" thinkers through the centuries,
treated women as a class apart. While making strong arguments for equality among men,
these theorists either ignored or opposed equality for women, adopting instead a view that
women's nature and proper mode of life were different from men's. For some, this was
combined with an explicit view of women as inferior; for others, such a hierarchical view
was implicit to the separate-sphere construction. See, e.g., id. at 79-82 (Aristotle), 102-03,
130-37 (Rousseau), 198-99 (Hobbes), 199-200 (Locke), 236-37 (Mill).
172. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (exempting women from serving as
jurors); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (prohibiting women from tending bar);
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (limiting the number of hours women could work);
Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874) (denying women the right to vote);
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873) (barring women from practicing law). As
the Supreme Court stated in upholding the exclusion of women from tending bar, "the
Constitution does not require [that] situations 'which are different in fact or opinion...
be treated in law as though they were the same.'" Goesaert, 335 U.S. at 466 (quoting
Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940)). Goesaert was the first major effort by women to
invoke the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause in the U.S. Supreme Court. See
Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution, 52 TuL L. Rxv. 451, 455 (1978). The Goesaert
Court's decision was disapproved in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n.23 (1976).
173. In Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), an Idaho law that preferred men over
women as estate administrators was held to offend the fourteenth amendment's equal pro-
tection clause. Without articulating any new doctrine, a unanimous Court ruled that the
mandatory preference was "the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the
Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 76. While the generalization underlying the statutory pref-
erence-- "that man represents the family outside the home"- arguably was as rational in
1971 as generalizations previously relied upon by the Court, in Reed the Court found
women and men sufficiently alike (or not sufficiently unalike) to require government to
treat them the same.
Prior to Reed, one exception to the pattern of upholding laws drawing sex lines was
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 201 U.S. 525 (1923), where a minimum-wage law for
women only was held to violate the Constitution's due process clause. Adkins was overruled
fourteen years later in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
The changes that took place in the 98 years between Bradwell and Reed included com-
plex social and economic changes in the role of women, legal extension to women of some
of the most basic rights which previously had been held only by men (e.g., the right to
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use of sex as a classifying tool has been held to offend the Consti-
tution in many contexts,174 although the basic concern with
whether men and women are "alike" or "unalike" continues to
deter meaningful scrutiny of some forms of explicit gender line
drawing. 7 5 Moreover, the premise that differences between the
vote), statutory enactments imposing certain equal-treatment requirements upon employers
and others (e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat.
241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-15 (1964)), repeal of some
discriminatory laws, and the rebirth in the 1960's of an active women's movement. See
generally Ginsburg, supra note 172, at 457-58. On the heels of these events, the Reed deci-
sion can be construed as essentially a judicial acknowledgement of the changes that had
taken place. In describing Reed and the cases that followed it, Professor Wendy Williams
explains that "in part what the Supreme Court did was simply to recognize that the real
world outside the courtroom had already changed." Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Re-
flections on Culture, Courts and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S R-rs. L. R.p. 175, 179 (1982). The new
direction Reed set in equal protection law was nevertheless significant since it signaled at
least that explicit sex-based legislative classifications would no longer conclusively be pre-
sumed to be constitutional.
174. See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151 (1980); Califano
v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Weinberger v. Wiesen-
feld, 420 U.S. 641, 648 (1975); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
In 1976, the Court explained that to survive constitutional scrutiny under the equal
protection clause, sex-based classifications must be "substantially related" to "important
governmental objectives." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). Subsequent Supreme
Court opinions reveal a considerable debate continuing among the justices over the appro-
priate standard of review in sex-discrimination claims. Compare the majority opinion in
Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 468-69 (1981), with Justice
Brennan's dissent therein, id. at 488, 489-92; see also Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Ho-
gan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 n.9 (1982) (O'Connor, J., writing for the Court, criticizing dissent-
ing opinions which urge the application of a less rigorous test to Hogan's sex-discrimina-
tion claim).
175. As Justice Stevens has explained:
In cases involving discrimination between men and women, the natural differ-
ences between the sexes are sometimes relevant and sometimes wholly irrele-
vant. If those differences are obviously irrelevant, the discrimination should be
treated as presumptively unlawful in the same way that racial classifications are
presumptively unlawful. . . . But if. . . there is an apparent connection be-
tween the discrimination and . . . [the] fact[s] . . . it may be appropriate to
presume that the classification is lawful. . . . Thus, instead of applying a "mid-
level" form of scrutiny in all sex discrimination cases, perhaps the burden is
heavier in some than in others.
Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 498 n.4 (1981) (dissenting
opinion) (citation omitted; emphasis added). Thus, despite the fact that "the natural differ-
ences between the sexes" often is neither obvious nor certain, and frequently depends
upon the category of comparison chosen, judicial perceptions of such differences affect the
analysis that is applied. See generally Freedman, supra note 5, at 943-47. Moreover, such
perceptions are determinative without regard to the detrimental effects of the official line
drawing. See Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 478 (1981)
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sexes justify treating females and males differently has led to only
the barest scrutiny of governmental action that disadvantages
women without drawing overt gender lines. 17  Where classifica-
tions are described in terms of characteristics or functions that are
not sex-explicit, any sex-based distinctions are seen as attributable
to the "real" differences in the extent to which females and males
possess the "characteristic" or perform the "function." The ad-
verse impact is not seen as presenting a problem of discrimination
at all. 177
(Stewart, J., concurring) (detrimental gender classifications do not always violate the Con-
stitution since the Constitution does recognize some differences between males and
females).
The view that women and men are different in fact-and therefore not similarly situ-
ated for purposes of equal-treatment requirements-has been expressly determinative in
cases upholding gender line drawing in situations including: (1) State laws giving unwed
fathers different rights than unwed mothers with respect to their children. See Lehr v.
Robertson, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983) (failure to give unwed father notice of proceeding to
adopt child); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (plurality opinion) (upholding Geor-
gia statute denying unwed father standing to sue third party for wrongful death of his child
unless the child had previously been legitimated through the state's prescribed proce-
dures). (2) State laws making it a crime for males under 18, but not underage females, to
engage in consensual intercourse with a member of the opposite sex under 18. See Michael
M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (plurality opinion). (3) Federal
requirements that only males need register for the draft. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S.
57 (1981).
In these cases, the Supreme Court found differential treatment to be justified by
women's "special" circumstances on a range of matters that reflect not only biology, but
also distinctions attributable to culturally imposed patterns, or created by government it-
self. There is no acknowledgement that finding differences in any case depends on the
categories chosen, and no concern with limiting the extent to which detrimental sex-based
classifications by government operate to create or exaggerate sexual differences, to confirm
male-oriented assumptions about females, or to reinforce the status quo. See generally C.
MAcKINNON, supra note 21, at 115; Loewy, Return to the Pedestal-The Supreme Court and
Gender Classification Cases: 1980 Terrm, 60 N.C.L. REv. 87 (1981) (discussing Roster and
Michael M.); Taub & Schneider, supra note 21, at 117-39. By identifying likeness as a pre-
requisite to requiring "treatment that is alike," this conception of equality cannot reach
the situations where women and men are farthest apart, and ignores the possibility that
equality can make women and men more similarly situated. C. MAcKmNON, supra note 21,
at 223-31.
176. See generally Freedman, supra note 5, at 942-43, 947-49.
177. Id. at 942 (the Rehnquist-Stewart approach).
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A. Adverse Impact and Discriminatory Purpose: Equal Protection
as Defined by Washington v. Davis and Its Progeny
The role of adverse impact in discrimination claims has been
both the subject of intense public policy debate17 8 and a contro-
versial issue in constitutional and statutory law.'1 In 1976, the Su-
preme Court resolved what has been described as "a conflicting
mass of precedent on the proper role of impact in constitutional
adjudication." 180 It ruled in Washington v. Davis"' that plaintiffs
challenging facially neutral government action as racially discrimi-
natory under the equal protection clause must establish both ad-
verse impact and discriminatory purpose in order to trigger the
strict scrutiny accorded race-discrimination claims.1 82
In constitutional and statutory claims decided prior to Davis,
the Supreme Court and lower courts had accorded greater signifi-
cance to evidence of disparate adverse impact. In several cases
where "disproportionate racial impact" was alleged to result from
ostensibly neutral official conduct, the conduct was subjected to
the same constitutional standard of scrutiny applied to explicit ra-
cial classifications.1 83 In Griggs v. Duke Power Company,18 the Su-
178. A recent example is the 1981 debate over amending the Voting Rights Act to
clarify whether plaintiffs must prove illicit intent to establish a violation. Compare H.R. REP.
No. 227, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 228-31 (1981), and S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-
43 (1982) (arguments that proof of discriminatory purpose should not be required), with id.
at 95-99, 127-54, 169-73 (views of Sen. Hatch) and id. at 221-36 (views of Sen. East) (argu-
ing that proof of discriminatory purpose should be required). The language enacted by
Congress makes clear that such proof is not required. See Blumstein, Defining and Proving
Race Discrimination: Perspectives on the Purpose vs. Results Approach from the Voting Rights Act,
69 VA. L. REv. 633 (1983); Parker, The "Results" Test of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act:
Abandoning the Intent Standard, 69 VA. L. REv. 715 (1983). See infra note 226.
179. See, e.g., Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Forward: In Defense of the Antidis-
crimination Principle, 90 HAiv. L. REv. 1 (1976); Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit
Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 36 (1977); Ely, Legislative
and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE LJ. 1205 (1970); Perry, The
Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 540 (1977).
180. Eisenberg, supra note 179, at 39.
181. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
182. See id. at 238-48.
183. See, e.g., Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 461-62 (1972)
(holding that discriminatory effect, rather than purpose, of city's decision to secede from
school system determined permissibility of action); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 732-
33 (1st Cir. 1972) (holding that discriminatory effect on minorities of requiring applicants
for police positions to take a written exam was intolerable because content of exam was not
substantially related to job performance). See generally Perry, supra note 179, at 54448.
Professor Perry discusses four cases which created uncertainty as to "whether the principal
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preme Court recognized disparate impact as a target of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.185 Describing this statute as aimed
at achieving "equality of employment opportunities,"""8 the Court
concluded that "[u]nder the Act, practices, procedures, or tests
neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot
be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior
discriminatory employment practices."187 Under the Griggs princi-
ple, a facially neutral employment practice violates Title VII if its
effect is discriminatory, unless it is shown to be "necessary to suc-
cessful performance on the job. ' " The presence of "good intent
or absence of discriminatory intent," the Court explained, "does
not redeem employment procedures that operate as 'built-in
headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring
job capability."189
The Griggs approach has been followed under other federal
and state anti-discrimination laws to require close judicial scrutiny
of facially neutral but factually discriminatory practices.190 The
element of a constitutional claim of racial discrimination was discriminatory purpose or
simply discriminatory effect." Id. at 544. The four cases are: Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364
U.S. 339, 342 (1960) (striking down an Alabama statute which had the "inevitable effect"
of depriving blacks of the right to vote); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384
(1968) (declaring that Gomillion stands "not for the proposition that legislative motive is a
proper basis for declaring a statute unconstitutional, but that the inevitable effect of a stat-
ute on its face may render it unconstitutional"); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225
(1971) (stating that the focus in earlier cases "was on the actual effect of the enactments,
not upon the motivation which led the States to behave as they did"); and Wright v. Coun-
cil of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 462 (1972) (invalidating withdrawal from a county school
system on the grounds that "[t]he existence of a permissible purpose cannot sustain an
action that has an impermissible effect"). See also Eisenberg, supra note 179, at 42-50 (dis-
cussing the role of impact).
184. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
185. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982).
186. 401 U.S. at 429.
187. Id. at 430.
188. 401 U.S. at 431-33, 436. See generally 1 A. LAisoN & L. LAsoN, EmptwymrErNr
DscaRImINATIoN §§ 14.20-.30 (1983). For an analysis suggesting that a retreat from the
Griggs standard, resulting in a lowering of defendant's burden of proof in disparate-impact
cases, has taken place and will continue to take place, see Furnish, A Path Through the Maze:
Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 After
Beazer and Burdine, 23 B.C.L. REv. 419 (1982). See generally Bartholet, Application of Title
VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HAiv. L. Rgv. 947, 950-55 (1982).
189. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
190. See, e.g., Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 3221, 3223 (1983)
(while holding that a showing of discriminatory intent is required for compensatory relief,
plurality agreed that intent is not necessary for injunctive noncompensatory relief under
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Davis Court, however, firmly rejected the Griggs approach and dis-
counted the prior constitutional precedent. While recognizing
that purportedly neutral action with a disparate impact may pre-
sent a problem of racial discrimination,19 1 the Court limited strict
judicial scrutiny of such action in constitutional cases to claims in-
volving purposeful racial discrimination.1 9 2
Denying strict scrutiny of discrimination claims based merely
on proof of disparate racial impact-that is, claims not bolstered
by proof of discriminatory purpose-comported with the Court's
professed concern with the manageability of judicial review and
the extent of judical involvement in governmental decisionmak-
ing.193 A constitutional rule that strict judicial scrutiny is triggered
by proof of disparate racial impact alone, the Court explained,
"would be far reaching. . . and perhaps invalidate a whole range
of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory and licensing statutes
that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average
black than to the more affluent white." " Such consequences
were viewed as "perhaps"'9 5 likely because the strict constitutional
scrutiny that would be triggered for race-discrimination claims is
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 127
(3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978) (Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of
1968), Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283,
1290 (7th Cir.) (Title VIII), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1977); School Comm. of Braintree
v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 377 Mass. 424, 429 n.10, 386 N.E.2d
1251, 1254 n.10 (1979) (Massachusetts statute prohibiting employment discrimination).
Congress recently amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-
110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982)) to make clear
that when ostensibly neutral voting practices produce racially disproportionate results, such
practices warrant careful scrutiny. Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (1982). See
infra note 226.
191. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242-43.
192. The Davis Court acknowledged that prior constitutional cases lent support to a
test that did not limit strict scrutiny to cases involving purposeful discrimination, 426 U.S.
at 242-43, but without fully reconciling this precedent, concluded that none required such
a rule. See Eisenberg, supra note 179, at 46; Perry, supra note 179, at 546.
193. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 247-48. Professor Perry describes the Court's rejection of
disparate-impact theory as its implicit rejection of a forceful judicial role in ameliorating
racial inequities. Perry, supra note 179, at 588. See also Note, Discriminatory Purpose and
Disproportionate Impact: An Assessment After Feeney, 79 CoLum. L. REv. 1376, 1383 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Discriminatory Purpose] ("the underpinnings of the discriminatory pur-
pose requirement are linked to the limits of judicial power, and the need to separate judi-
cial from legislative and administrative functions").
194. Davis, 426 U.S. at 248.
195. Id.
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" 'strict' in theory" but effectively "fatal in fact."1 6
The Supreme Court avoided such a slippery slope by making
a showing of discriminatory purpose a threshold requirement to
strict judicial scrutiny of race-discrimination claims. The Court
defended this approach by describing it as consistent with "the
basic equal protection principle that the invidious quality of a law
claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to
a racially discriminatory purpose." 197 The Court never paused to
consider whether other threshold factors "98 or a more flexible
level of scrutiny19 might be a more appropriate way to limit judi-
cial invalidation of legislative and administrative handiwork. How-
ever, the Court did indicate that the requisite discriminatory pur-
pose could "be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts," 200
including the presence of discriminatory impact. In subsequent
race-discrimination cases, this requirement was found to be satis-
fied by such objective factors as the foreseeable consequences of
an ostensibly neutral policy201 and the presence of subjective deci-
sionmaking.20 2 The measurability of these factors theoretically al-
lowed plaintiffs to prove "discriminatory purpose" with objective
evidence.2 03
196. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on
a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAiv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972). The
Court suggested that a rule requiring strict scrutiny of disparate-impact claims should await
legislative prescription. 426 U.S. at 248.
The decision in Washington v. Davis has been criticized as resting "more on fear of a
pure impact test than on the cogency of the standard it adopted." Eisenberg, supra note
179, at 47; see also Perry, supra note 179, at 544.
197. Davis, 426 U.S. at 240.
198. See infra text accompanying notes 286-309.
199. See infra text accompanying notes 311-15.
200. Davis, 426 U.S. at 241-42.
201. See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464-65 (quoting Penick
v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 229, 255 (1977) (foreseeable effects standard "is
one factor among many others which may be considered by a court")), reh'g denied, 444
U.S. 887 (1979); Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 1983).
202. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496, 497 (1977) (mathematical dis-
parities in racial make-up of grand juries in Texas, combined with highly subjective nature
of selecting jurors, were sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination).
203. See Weinzweig, Discriminatory Impact and Intent Under the Equal Protection Clause:
The Supreme Court and the Mind-Body Problem, 1 LAw & INEQuALrry 277, 313-18 (1983).
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B. The Equal Protection Clause Applied to Facially Neutral Action
That in Actual Effect Discriminates Against Women
When the Supreme Court imposed the discriminatory-pur-
pose threshold requirement for the first time in a case challenging
ostensibly neutral action that disproportionately disadvantaged
women, it again failed to consider alternative approaches.'"
Moreover, it transformed the multi-factored purpose requirement
applied to race-discrimination claims in Washington v. Davis and its
progeny into a search for a smoking gun of illicit intent.20 5
The state statute challenged in Personnel Administrator of Mas-
sachusetts v. Feeney2°6 gave veterans applying for public jobs a life-
long absolute preference over non-veterans. The statute's classify-
ing characteristic-veteran status-was not sex-specific. However,
because over 98% of all veterans were male at the time of the
challenge,207 the facially neutral rule had a decidedly non-neutral
impact: it gave unlimited job preferences to a virtually all-male
group at the expense of females and other males. Operating as a
job requirement few women could satisfy, this preferential system
devastated women's ability to secure desirable civil service posi-
tions.2 08 The result was a work force in which men predominated
in higher-grade, higher-paying positions in the government job hi-
erarchy, while women were concentrated in the lower-grade,
lower-paying positions such as clerical jobs.2 09
By defining veterans as the "preferred" group, the chal-
lenged Massachusetts statute implicitly built upon the express le-
gal impediments that previously had prevented women from qual-
ifying as members of the armed services,2 10 thereby effectively
incorporating the overt gender lines originating in federal mili-
204. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 446 U.S. 256 (1979).
205. Soifer, Complacency and Constitutional Law, 42 OHno ST. L.J. 383, 388, 401, 404
(1981); see also Weinzweig, supra note 203, at 308-22.
206. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 259, 263 n.10 (quoting the text of MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
31, § 23, which is now codified as amended at MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 31, § 26 (West
1979)).
207. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 270.
208. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 260 (quoting Feeney v. Massachusetts, 451 F. Supp. 143, 149
(D. Mass. 1978)).
209. See Feeney, 451 F. Supp. at 148-49 (large percentage of women served in lower-
grade positions for which men traditionally did not apply). See also text accompanying notes
94-97.
210. Women's participation in the military has been severely proscribed throughout
American history. See generally Goodman, supra note 95.
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tary law and policies.21 The district court concluded that while
"the law may be facially neutral in the limited sense," it is more
realistically viewed as "substantively non-neutral, 212 and ruled
that it violated the federal equal protection clause.213
Massachusetts' appeal from this decision presented the Su-
preme Court with its first sex-discrimination challenge against a
law that was not sex-explicit since its pronouncement in Washing-
ton v. Davis. Treating the Massachusetts statute as facially neu-
tral 14 the Court acknowledged that the challenged preference
had a "severe" impact on the public employment opportunities of
women. 15 The Court then considered whether the disparate im-
pact could be traced to a purposeful discrimination.2 6 In conclud-
ing that it could not, the Court articulated an exceedingly narrow
view of discriminatory purpose. The Feeney Court explained that
plaintiffs challenging a law which the court considers to be facially
neutral have the burden of showing that "the decisionmakers...
selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part
'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an
identifiable group."217
The literal interpretation of this "because of" language, and
211. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 283-84 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
212. Feeney, 451 F. Supp. at 151-52. Accord, 442 U.S. at 282 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
213. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts reached this
conclusion twice. In its first decision invalidating the veterans-preference law, the three-
judge court relied on First Circuit cases and applied heightened judicial scrutiny once
plaintiffs had established a disproportionate adverse impact on women. See Anthony v.
Commonwealth, 415 F. Supp. 485 (D. Mass. 1976). On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated
and remanded to the district court for further consideration in light of its decision in Da-
vis. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 434 U.S. 884 (1977). On remand, the district court reaf-
firmed its original judgment. Feeney v. Commonwealth, 451 F. Supp. 143 (D. Mass. 1978),
rev'd, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). It found the sex discrimination intentional under the standard
of Davis and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977),
which elaborated the Davis rule. 451 F. Supp. at 146-51 (Campbell, J., concurring). Pro-
ceeding to apply heightened scrutiny as before, the statute again failed to survive this judi-
cial review and was ruled unconstitutional. The Feeney appeal discussed in the text is from
this second district court ruling.
214. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 274 (appellee conceded that the statute was neutral on its
face).
215. Id. at 271.
216. Id. at 272-76. The Court described a "two-fold inquiry" when a statute "gender-
neutral on its face is challenged on the grounds that its effects upon women are dispropor-
tionately adverse." Id. at 274. Question one is whether the statute is indeed neutral. If it is,
question two is whether the adverse effects reflect "invidious gender-based discrimination."
Id.
217. Id. at 279.
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its application in Feeney, goes significantly beyond prior case law
on the issue of discriminatory purpose. Instead of a multi-factored
standard, the Feeney Court's formulation required plaintiffs to
show that a "desire to harm" women was determinative in the
decisionmaking process.21 Moreover, the Feeney Court made clear
that this requirement "implies more than . . . volition or . . .
awareness of consequences," and minimized the probative value
of objective evidence such as "foreseeability of harm." 219 It estab-
lished, in short, a subjective standard for measuring the deci-
sionmaker's purpose.220
The "because of' test posed a particular problem in Feeney,
since, in the Court's words, the "legitimate and worthy" 221 pur-
pose of the veterans-preference law-aiding veter-
ans-"compelled the conclusion" that the legislature would have
passed a preference program even if it did not adversely affect
women.2 2 2 Accordingly, it could not be established that the chal-
lenged law was enacted because it had such adverse impact. This
test ignored, however, the legislature's apparent willingness to let
the burden of its action fall so severely on women. 228
Since the plaintiffs in Feeney could not satisfy the Court's re-
quirement of showing discriminatory purpose, judicial review of
the veterans-preference law was limited to the deferential "ration-
ality" standard of review.2  It easily passed this relaxed level of
scrutiny.22 5
As argued below, 226 the approach adopted by the Court in
218. See Soifer, supra note 205, at 401.
219. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279 n.25. The Court rejected foreseeability as anything more
than supporting an inference of intent. See Discriminatory Purpose, supra note 193, at 1391-
92, 1397.
220. See Weinzweig, supra note 203, at 308-20.
221. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 274.
222. Id. at 277.
223. As one commentator critical of this definition of "discriminatory intent" noted,
"it is entirely consistent with this analysis to conclude further that the legislature would not
have enacted a preference with such a devastating effect on women unless it held the view
that it was unimportant for women to have an opportunity for meaningful employment."
Discriminatory Purpose, supra note 193, at 1398.
224. See Gunther, supra note 196, at 18-19.
225. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 280-81.
226. See infra notes 227-40 and accompanying text. In the case of City of Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), the Supreme Court applied the Feeney smoking-gun discrimi-
natory-intent requirement for establishing a violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act. This approach was soundly repudiated by Congress, which amended section 2 of the
124 (Vol. 33
SEXUAL EQUALITY
Feeney is fundamentally flawed. First, it fails to address adequately
the nature of sex discrimination and ignores the understanding
articulated in cases involving explicit gender lines. Second, it ef-
fectively precludes meaningful judicial scrutiny of a significant
class of actions that enforce or perpetuate sexual inequality.
Third, it sets the judiciary on a path that is treacherous as well as
misguided. Finally, it is, ultimately, futile.
The Feeney Court's insistence that rules which disadvantage
women violate the constitutional command of equality only when
they are motivated by a desire to harm women fundamentally mis-
conceives the nature of discrimination. As the Court itself has ac-
knowledged in sex-discrimination cases involving express gender
lines, traditional ways of thinking about the sexes, and indiffer-
ence to the effects of government action on the disadvantaged
sex, can be, and often are, at the root of discrimination.227 The
majority in Feeney neither acknowledged nor reconciled the fact
that imposing the discriminatory purpose requirement was actu-
ally inconsistent with principles it had previously articulated in
cases involving sex-discrimination claims.228 Ignoring these prior
Voting Rights Act to make clear that the proper focus must be on the consequences of the
challenged system rather than on the underlying intent or motivation. Voting Rights Act
Amendment of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982). Congress described the
intent test as inappropriate largely because the test asks the "wrong question." The thresh-
old intent test was rejected and replaced by a result-oriented standard. See H.R. REa'. No.
227, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 28-30 (1981); S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 27-30, 36-
37, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 177, 204-08, 214-15 (Voting Rights Act
Extension). See also supra note 178. For commentary approving the intent requirement, see
Blumstein, supra note 178; Simon, Racially Prejudicial Governmental Actions: A Motivation
Theory of the Constitutional Ban Against Racial Discrimination, 15 SAN DmGo L. Rav. 1041
(1978).
227. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text. Racial discrimination similarly may
be traced to racially selective indifference. See, e.g., General Contractors Bldg. Ass'n v.
Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 411-14 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (equal employment
opportunities may be denied through callous indifference or insensitivity to the exclusion-
ary effects of actions); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 366 (1972) (Marshall, J., concur-
ring) (death penalty is tolerated only because its burden falls mostly on members of minor-
ity groups and the poor); Brest, supra note 179, at 14-15.
228. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text. Indeed, while insisting in this con-
text that proof of intent is essential, the Court has in other situations refused to scrutinize
closely some explicit sex classifications precisely because they were viewed as intentional.
See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 74 (1981); Michael M. v. Sonoma County Supe-
rior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 471 n.6 (1981) (plurality opinion); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787,
799 (1977). See generally Equal Rights AmendmenL" Hearings on H.R.J. Res. 1 Before the Sub-
comm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary of the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983); Weinzweig, supra note 203, at 329.
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cases, the Court erroneously looked for invidious intent motivat-
ing the governmental action that was expressed in terms seen as
facially neutral.
Even when illicit intent does consciously motivate facially neu-
tral governmental conduct, requiring plaintiffs to prove such dis-
criminatory purpose as a threshold condition for meaningful con-
stitutional review effectively immunizes such action .2' The
motivation of official decisionmakers is often impossible to deter-
mine.230 The problems of proof include lack of evidence,"" uncer-
tainty over whose intentions control or when they should be mea-
sured,3 2 and the reality that different decisionmakers typically act
for different reasons. 33 As the Supreme Court noted in Palmer v.
Thompson,2 " "it is difficult or impossible for any court to deter-
mine the 'sole' or 'dominant' motivation behind the choices of a
group of legislators."'235 Moreover, discriminatory purpose may be
masked or concealed, particularly as decisionmakers become more
careful in hiding their motivation when it is based upon animus.23 6
229. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 179; Perry, supra note 179; Soifer, supra note 205.
See also S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 36, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 177, 214 (Voting Rights Act Extension).
230. Where proof of illicit motivation can be established, it should be sufficient to inval-
idate the conduct that causes sex-based harm. Such proof, however, should not be deemed
necessary to establish a constitutional violation.
231. The intent in the minds of decisionmakers-particularly when it is ma-
lign-might never be expressed, and when it is expressed a record of such expression is
not always retained. Few state legislatures and local governing bodies keep or publish
records of deliberations. See Parker, supra note 178, at 740-41. See also Brest, Palmer v.
Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REv.
95, 123-24 (1971). Professor Miller labels the quest "bootless" because, inter alia, "on
many statutes an individual member simply has no intent." Miller, If "The Devil Himself
Knows Not the Mind of Man," How Possibly Can Judges Know the Motivation of Legislators?, 15
SAN DiEGo L. REv. 1167, 1170 (1978).
232. See, e.g., Alexander, Motivation and Constitutionality, 15 SAN Dis.o L. REv. 925,
937-38 (1978) (difficulties in attributing motive to collective bodies); Brest, supra note 231,
at 124. In Bolden, the issue was an electoral system created nearly 70 years earlier. The
motives of the officials who created that electoral system "is of the most limited relevance."
S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 36, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. Naws
177, 214. The more relevant concern was considered to be whether minorities have equal
access to the process of electing representatives and not whether the motives in establish-
ing the process were improper.
233. See Parker, supra note 178, at 740.
234. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
235. Id. at 225.
236. See S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 37, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 177, 215.
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The discriminatory-purpose threshold requirement also is
problematic and unacceptable because it directs judges onto the
treacherous path of inquiring into the subjective motivation of of-
ficial decisionmakers 37 Often judges are reluctant to question the
purity of other officials' motives. The Committee on the Judiciary
of the United States Senate has labeled such inquiry "unnecessa-
rily divisive" in the context of race-discrimination claims "because
it involves charges of racism on the part of individual officials or
entire communities.''23 8 Charges of "sexism" are similarly divisive.
Finally, insisting upon motive as a threshold condition to close
scrutiny of ostensibly neutral action ultimately is futile. Even after
invalidation, a facially neutral rule with a discriminatory effect
could be reestablished by decisionmakers acting for different
reasons.
2 89
What had been articulated in Davis as a principle to limit
wholesale invalidation of facially neutral policies was converted in
Feeney into an effectively "impermeable"2 40 bar to judicial review.
As a result, such discriminatory policies are sanctioned without re-
gard to whether they enforce or perpetuate sexual inequality.
This formidable obstacle to disparate-impact claims under the
equal protection clause is even more problematic given the range
of governmental conduct to which the "facially neutral" label has
been attached. For example, the Supreme Court concluded in
237. Professor Karst, for example, describes the cost of inquiring into the good faith
of officials, and the potential judicial reluctance to challenge the purity of other officials'
motives. Karst, The Cost ofMotive-Centered Inquiry, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1163, 1164 (1978).
See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 642-53 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Weinzweig,
supra note 203, at 319. Professor Miller views motivation inquiry as one that expands
rather than diminishes the role of the judiciary. See generally Miller, supra note 231, at
1170.
238. S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 36, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 177, 214.
239. See, e.g., Thompson, 403 U.S. at 225. Indeed, the Feeney intent formulation puts a
premium on ignoring the problems faced by disadvantaged groups, since illicit intent can-
not be established if no attention is paid to the interests of these groups at all. See Binion,
"Intent" and Equal Protection: A Reconsideration, 1983 Sup. CT. Rrv. 397, 442-43 (1983). In
addition, by making bad intent a threshold requirement to trigger meaningful equal protec-
tion review, this standard creates the anomaly that government action motivated by dis-
criminatory racial intent, and successful in achieving the discriminatory effect sought, can
nevertheless be justified since in theory it could survive strict scrutiny analysis. See supra
note 230.
240. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 141 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Geduldig v. Aiello, M decided two years before Feeney, that a gov-
ernment program which singled out pregnant women for disad-
vantageous treatment was "neutral" rather than sex-based. Distin-
guishing this government program as "a far cry from cases . . .
involving discrimination based upon gender as such, 24 2 the gov-
ernment policy in Geduldig was described as "dividing potential
recipients into two groups-pregnant women and nonpregnant
persons." 24 The Court's view of pregnancy-based classifications as
facially neutral was sharply disputed by Justice Brennan in his
Geduldig dissent,' and firmly repudiated by Congress when it
amended Title VII in 1978 to define the statute's prohibition
against employment discrimination "based on" or on "account of
. . . sex" as including discrimination "based on" or on "account of
pregnancy."' 5 This statutory definition does not, however, alter
the Geduldig Court's analysis of pregnancy as a neutral classifica-
tion in the context of claims under the equal protection clause. 248
The Court's treatment of pregnancy-based classifications illus-
trates that in cases involving sex-discrimination claims even the
conclusion that governmental action is "facially neutral" is subject
241. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
242. Id. at 496 n.20.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 501. Justice Brennan describes the challenged program as establishing one
set of rules for females and another for males, on the basis of physical characteristics "inex-
tricably linked to one sex."
[B]y singling out for less favorable treatment a gender-linked disability peculiar
to women, the State has created a double standard for disability compensation:
a limitation is imposed upon the disabilities for which women workers may re-
cover, while men receive full compensation for all disabilities suffered, includ-
ing those that affect only or primarily their sex, such as prostatectomies, cir-
cumcision, hemophilia and gout.
Id.
245. Pub. L. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982)).
This amendment followed a series of decisions in which the Supreme Court applied the
Geduldig reasoning in cases under Title VII. See, e.g., Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S.
136 (1977); General Elec. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). With enactment of the Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act in 1978, Congress "unambiguously expressed its disapproval of
both the holding and the reasoning of the Court in the Gilbert decision." Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 103 S. Ct. 2622, 2628 (1983). The Court has
interpreted this legislation as making clear that "for all Title VII purposes, discrimination
based on a woman's pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination because of her sex." Id. at
2631. Under Title VII, at least, different treatment of pregnancy can no longer be mis-
taken as "sex neutral."
246. See Newport News Shipbuilding v. EEOC, 103 Ct. at 2632 n.26.
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to conflicting interpretations.117 The potentially elastic reach of
the facially sex-neutral label has been apparent in lower court de-
cisions 248 and in attempts by defendants to avoid heightened equal
protection scrutiny. 49 When implicit sexual distinctions are made
that effectively distinguish men and women, the inquiry into neu-
trality becomes problematic. 250 Although a court must address the
threshold question as to whether or not a particular action is
facially neutral, there are no guidelines to shape the necessary
analysis.
For these reasons, the protection provided by the Supreme
Court for sex-discrimination claimants under the equal protection
clause does not encompass significant governmental action that
disadvantages women. Current equal protection doctrine fails to
look beyond the appearance of neutrality and refuses to recognize
that actions based on sexually unique physical characteristics such
as pregnancy are sex-based. The view of equality as a mere com-
mand for treatment that is not sex-explicit or exclusive on its face
is too simplistic. This view ignores the fact that sexual inequality
can be and is maintained through a variety of mechanisms.
By focusing on form over substance, the Court's analysis of
sex-discrimination claims under the equal protection clause avoids
careful scrutiny of policies and practices that have been built by
men for a world of men, and ignores what happens when such
247. The Court's decision in Geduldig v. Aiello sparked a storm of criticism. See, e.g.,
Erickson, Equalty Between the Sexes in the 1980's, 28 CLEv. ST. L. Rav. 591, 598 (1979);
Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court: 1971-74, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 617, 683-92
(1974); Scales, supra note 85.
248. See, e.g., Norris v. Arizona, 486 F. Supp. 645, 651 (D. Ariz. 1980), affd on other
grounds, 671 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1982), affid, 103 S. Ct. 3492 (1983). The district court,
citing Feeney, dismissed plaintiffs constitutional claim on the ground that the law authorizing
retirement benefits was gender-neutral, even though the defendant had contracted with an
insurer who provided insurance paying lower retirement benefits to women. 486 F. Supp.
at 651. The decision to uphold plaintiff's Title VII claim, which subsequently was affirmed
by the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court, supported the view that the challenged ac-
tion was sex-discriminatory treatment. 103 S. Ct. at 3493.
249. See Heckler v. Matthews, 104 S. Ct. 1387 (1984). In this challenge to a Social
Security eligibility provision incorporating by reference a sex-specific classification which
previously had been invalidated, the Department of Justice characterized the provision as
facially neutral, and argued in support of its validity that Congress acted without any "sex-
ually discriminatory animus." Jurisdictional Statement, No. 82-1050, at 11, 13-14. The
Court recognized that the provision created a gender-based dependency test, 104 S. Ct. at
1391, but nevertheless concluded that it was substantially related to important governmen-
tal objectives and therefore constitutionally permissible. Id. at 1391-92.
250. See Discriminatory Purpose, supra note 193, at 1382 n.39.
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policies are applied to women. Although presented as mere judi-
cial deference to other decisionmakers, the doctrine reflects a pol-
icy judgment that is not value-free."' Justified as an "appropri-
ate" limitation on judicial involvement in other branches of
government, it may insulate judicial decisionmaking as well. 252
Moreover, the impact of this doctrine extends beyond the judicial
sanction of particular government policies that disadvantage
women. By equating "equality" with "facial neutrality," it discour-
ages legislative reform and deters corrective action which could
accelerate-and may be essential to-the process of achieving
equality.253
III. THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT
A. A Constitutional Doctrine Aimed at Sexual Equality Under the Law
Unlike the equal protection clause, the proposed federal
Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) directly targets the denial or
abridgement of "equality of rights under law . on account of
sex" as the problem to be eradicated.'" To be an effective force
toward achieving this end, the ERA must be free from the doc-
trines that have shielded important aspects of sexual inequality
from constitutional scrutiny under the equal protection clause.255
251. See Soifer, supra note 205, at 402-03.
252. Cf. Wikler, supra note 155 (judicial attitudes).
253. Closely related to the approach of equating facial neutrality with equal treatment
is the view that affirmative action-a departure from neutrality to remedy the effects of
past discrimination-violates the principle of equal treatment. See generally U.S. COMM'N ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE 1980s: DISMANTLING THE PROCESS OF DISCRIMINA-
TION (1981). Here again, the failure to look beneath the surface of facial neutrality to its
content and impact effectively operates to legitimize the status quo. An important concep-
tual distinction between disparate-impact theory and affirmative action, however, is that
the former seeks to invalidate neutral practices which harm a particular group while the
latter invokes explicit classifications to aid a disadvantaged group on the theory that mere
neutrality will not overcome past discrimination. See Perry, supra note 179, at 561.
254. See supra note 16.
255. This is premised, of course, on the conclusion that the meaning of sexual equality
is broader than that reflected in current judicial interpretations of the equal protection
clause. Whether it also is necessary to reject the Aristotelian equality formulation ("likes
shall be treated alike") depends on how one views the relationship between contemporary
equal protection doctrine and this conception of equality. There is little agreement on this
point. Compare C. MACKINNON, supra note 21 (suggesting current doctrines are logical ap-
plications of this view of equality), with Baker, Neutrality, Process and Rationality: Flawed In-
terpretations of Equal Protection, 58 TEx. L. Rxv. 1029 (1980) (considers neutrality/process
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The legislative history that accompanied the ERA when Con-
gress recommended the proposed amendment to the states for
ratification in 1972256 firmly rejected the equal protection doc-
trine which prevailed at that time as inadequate for resolving sex-
discrimination claims . 57 This rejection has been the foundation of
interpretations of state equal rights amendments in several juris-
dictions.258 Given the developments in equal protection law dur-
interpretations of the equal protection clause as flawed). Other models have been sug-
gested as better approaches to the meaning of equal protection. See, e.g., Karst, Foreward:
Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1977) (equality of
respect analysis).
256. H.R.J. Res. 208, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., was approved by the House of Represent-
atives on October 12, 1971, 117 CONG. Rm 35,815 (1971), and the Senate on March 22,
1972, 118 CONG. REc. 9598 (1972). The proposal to add an equal rights amendment to the
federal Constitution dates back to 1923, when it was first introduced in Congress. The
substance of this amendment has been given serious consideration by the United States
Congress on several occasions. See generally Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal
Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 886-88
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Yale ERA Study].
On June 30, 1982, the time alloted for ratification of H.R.J. Res. 208 expired without
ratification by the necessary 38 states. The original deadline set for ratification, March 22,
1979, was extended (to June 30, 1982) by Congress in 1978, H.J. Res. 638, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1978). See H.R. REP. No. 1405, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 10,021. A lower federal court's ruling that the extension was invalid
was stayed by the Supreme Court, which subsequently dismissed the case as moot after
ratification was not secured by the extended deadline. Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F. Supp.
1107 (D. Idaho 1981), stayed, 455 U.S. 918 (1982), dismissed as moot sub nom. Nat'l Org. for
Women, Inc. v. Idaho, 459 U.S. 809 (1982).
The proposed amendment was ratified by 35 states. U.S. CoMM'N ON CrvIL RIGHTS, Tim
EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT: GUARANTEEING EQUAL RIGHTS FOR WOMEN UNDER THE CONSTI-
TUTION 2 (1981) [hereinafter cited as THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT]. The legislatures in
five of these states voted to rescind their ratification. The lower court which ruled the
extension invalid also ruled these rescissions valid, Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F. Supp. at 1146-
50. This ruling was similarly stayed and subsequently dismissed as moot by the Supreme
Court, 103 S. Ct. at 22. Prior to the Idaho ruling, rescissions of constitutional ratification
votes had never been recognized as valid. See generally Ginsburg, Ratification of the Equal
Rights Amendment: A Question of Time, 57 TEx. L. REv. 919, 939 (1979).
257. See S. REP. No. 689, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1972). While some members of Con-
gress suggested in 1971-1972 that the ERA would operate within the framework of the
equal protection clause, see Dillion, Congressional Intent and the ERA: A Proposed New Analy-
sis, 40 Omo ST. L.J. 637, 643 nn.52-53 (1979), the leading proponents did not. Id. at 643
nn.54 & 57, 645.
258. See, e.g., Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 871-72, 540 P.2d 882, 889-90 (1975)
(state ERA intended to change existing state constitutional law governing sex discrimina-
tion); Lowell v. Kowalski, 380 Mass. 663, 665-66, 666 n.7, 405 N.E.2d 135, 138 n.7 (1980)
(state ERA "more stringent" than federal fourteenth amendment); Rand v. Rand, 280 Md.
508, 512, 515-16, 374 A.2d 900, 903 (1977) (citing Darrin with approval).
Not all states have interpreted the equal rights provisions in their constitutions as re-
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ing the past decade, such doctrinal departure continues to be im-
perative. In particular, the decisive distinction drawn in equal
protection claims between facially neutral and sex-explicit action
should not be attached to the ERA because of the extent to which
these two types of conduct may manifest the same sexual biases
and cause similar sex-based harms.
Purportedly neutral official action that operates to reinforce
sexual inequality consistently has been identified as among the
problems that the ERA would address.2 5 This central proposition
was reemphasized in the recent Congressional hearings on the
ERA where testimony describing the problems of sex discrimina-
tion highlighted many areas of official conduct generally labeled
"facially neutral."26 Congressional proponents indicated their in-
tent that "supposedly sex-neutral laws which actually discriminate
against women" will be subject to challenge under the ERA.2 1
Such testimony made clear that governmental conduct which is
facially neutral but factually discriminatory is within the amend-
ment's aim.262
State ERA implementation efforts confirm this view. Commis-
sions established by states to guide the process of statutory compli-
ance with constitutional equal rights provisions defined the scope
of their mandate to include facially neutral laws with "a readily
discernible or potentially discriminatory impact." 263 Legislative ac-
quiring a different doctrinal approach from that followed under the federal equal protec-
tion clause. See, e.g., Plas v. State, 598 P.2d 966, 968 (Alaska 1979); State v. Craig, 169
Mont. 150, 156, 545 P.2d 649, 653 (1976). The language of the Alaska and Montana pro-
visions, however, is considerably different from the proposed federal equal rights
amendment.
259. See, e.g., Yale ERA Study, supra note 158, at 900; Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 4 of
the House Comm. on theJudiciary, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 701 (1971) (Report of the President's
Task Force on Women's Rights and Responsibilities describing inequities in social-security
system); Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 112 (1970) (testimony of Marguerite Rawalt addressing lack
of recognition and value accorded homemaking work); see also B. BROWN, supra note 112,
at 16-17.
260. See Equal Rights Amendment Hearings on H.J. Res. 1 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the HouseJudidary Comm., 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (testimony of
Ann Freedman, at 10-14) (testimony of Diana Pearce, at 14-19) (testimony of Dorothy Rid-
ings, at 9-10) (testimony of Tish Sommers, at 47-53).
261. 129 CONG. REc. H9852 (1983) (remarks of Rep. Ferraro). See also id. at H9838
(remarks of Rep. Sikorski); id. at H9852 (remark of Rep. Mikulski).
262. Hearings, supra note 260 (testimony of Thomas Emerson, at 9-12) (testimony of
Ann Freedman, at 5-10) (testimony of Laurence Tribe, at 7).
263. See, e.g., MAss. S. Doc. No. 1689, at 3 (1976) (Interim Report of the Special Coin-
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tions taken to comply with newly adopted equal rights provisions
in state constitutions have reformed such laws. 2  State courts
have interpreted state ERAs to support decisions abrogating os-
tensibly neutral rules such as interspousal tort immunity'" and ar-
tificial limits on spousal support awards,26 6 as well as decisions re-
jecting a marital property presumption that household goods are
owned by the spouse who purchased them.2 7 These actions re-
flect the understanding that facially neutral policies in some cir-
cumstances may operate to deny equality of rights under law on
account of sex.2 8
In addition, the legislative history that preceded Congres-
sional adoption of the ERA proposal in 19722" and the recent
hearings270 confirm that governmental classification lines based on
mission) (established by Massachusetts legislature in 1975 to study effect on existing stat-
utes of ratification of the then-pending Massachusetts and federal Equal Rights Amend-
ments; included in the research were "statutes which were sex-neutral on their face but
had a readily discernable or potentially discriminatory impact").
264. Hearings, supra note 260 (testimony of Colo. Governor Richard Lamm); GovR-
NOR'S COMM'N TO STUDY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT, REPORT TO
THE GOVERNOR 3 (Md. 1979). Legislative reform in Maryland has included extending the
minimum wage to domestic workers, increasing opportunities for part-time employment,
and requiring creditors to consider alimony in determining eligibility for credit. Id. at 24,
27.
265. See Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. App. 242, 274-75, 462 A.2d 506, 522 (1983)
(describing the immunity doctrine as "a rule in derogation of married women"). But see
Smith v. Smith, 240 Pa. Super. 97, 361 A.2d 756 (1976); Tyrken v. Tyrken, 63 Ill. App.
3d 199, 379 N.E.2d 804 (1978).
266. Holmes v. Holmes, 124 PrrrsBURGH LEGAL J. 196 (Ct. Common Pleas 1978); see
supra text accompanying notes 120-21.
267. See Di Florido v. Di Florido, 459 Pa. 641, 331 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1975), where the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court opted for a presumption of equal ownership of marital prop-
erty instead of requiring that spouses prove purchase to assert ownership claims, reasoning
that even if the husband is the "sole provider," "it is likely that both spouses have contrib-
uted in some way to the acquisition and/or upkeep of, . . .and intend to benefit by the
use of, the goods and furnishings in the household. . . ." Id. at 651,'331 A.2d at 179.
268. See also Official Opinion No. 57, Ops. Pa. Att'y. Gen. 157 (1973) (minimum
height requirement for service in State Police discriminates against women and Spanish-
surnamed males). Cf. Snider v. Thornburgh, 496 Pa. 159, 175-77, 436 A.2d 593, 601
(1981) (facially neutral practices may be sex discriminatory, but to offend the ERA, the
violation must be "under law"); Guinn v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 33 Pa.
Commw. 596, 382 A.2d 503 (1978) (suggesting sufficient disparate impact was not estab-
lished); Gilman v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 28 Pa. Commw. 630, 636, 369
A.2d 895, 898 (1977) (statistical evidence insufficient).
269. See supra note 256. See also B. BROWN, supra note 112, at 15-16.
270. See infra notes 272, 274 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 260-62 and
accompanying text.
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pregnancy or other unique physical characteristics may violate the
ERA. The fiction that prevails in current equal protection doc-
trine, where laws concerning pregnancy are confused with "neu-
trality,"27 1 would be removed from constitutional analysis under
the ERA and the sex-based nature of such classifications would be
clear.
The "unique physical characteristics doctrine" spelled out in
the prior legislative history of the ERA provides the framework to
scrutinize closely laws concerning pregnancy and other actual
unique physical conditions which are sex-specific. This doctrine
recognizes both that (1) lines drawn according to sex-unique phys-
ical characteristics are on account of sex, and (2) such lines may
result in the denial of sexual equality under law.n Unlike the sit-
uation with sex-explicit classifications, however, it is not possible
to generalize that all classifications in terms of actual unique physi-
cal characteristics are too broad or too narrow.2 7 8 Accordingly,
271. See supra notes 241-46 and accompanying text. Official action drawing lines based
on unique physical characteristics has been a central mechanism for enforcing inequality of
the sexes by disadvantaging women. Treatment of pregnancy-a sex-unique characteristic
widely used to differentiate the legal status of men and women-has operated to place
limits on women's employment and to deny women benefits available to others. See supra
notes 81-91 and accompanying text. See generally, Hillman, Sex and Employment Under the
Equal Rights Amendment, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 789, 797-809 (1973); Scales, supra note 85, at
424-26; Williams, supra note 86, at 654-55. Congress recognized this when it considered,
and passed, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 amending Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000c(k)
(1982)).
272. The "unique physical characteristic doctrine" under the ERA has been criticized
as allowing classification lines based on pregnancy to be considered outside the equality
mandate. See, e.g., C. MACKmNoN, supra note 21, at 114-15; Scales, supra note 85, at 415-
22. This criticism is, however, misplaced. Rather than considering such classification lines
to be outside the equality mandate, the doctrine clarifies how the mandate would apply. In
contrast to equal protection doctrine, the ERA approach sharply limits the type of differ-
ences which may be relevant in deciding sex discrimination claims: they are physical (in
contrast to the equal protection approach which still recognizes as "real" differences which
are culturally or legally imposed) and sex-unique (in contrast to the averages and general-
izations traditionally deemed significant under the equal protection clause). Moreover, even
when actual sex-unique physical characteristics are involved, strict scrutiny would be re-
quired under the ERA (again in contrast to the equal protection doctrine, where the in-
quiry effectively ends once differences are deemed real). Each case where government at-
tempts to defend a challenged action by relying on this doctrine will require
determinations as to whether the action does concern actual physical characteristics which
are sex-unique, and whether the action is necessary to satisfy a compelling government
objective. An essential component of this latter inquiry is whether alternative actions could
serve the government's objective without drawing the challenged distinction.
273. Properly tailored government policies granting nutritional supplements during
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the strict scrutiny to be applied under the ERA to classification
lines based on actual sex-unique physical characteristics would
permit policies incorporating such distinctions to be sustained in a
limited number of circumstances.2 7
Both the text and the aim of the proposed federal ERA fur-
ther compel the conclusion that the amendment requires careful
scrutiny of the forms of official conduct now sanctioned under
equal protection law as facially neutral. The amendment would
plainly prohibit states and the United States from denying or
abridging equality of rights under law on account of sex-not
merely in terms of sex.27 5 The amendment aims, in short, to rem-
edy the problem of sexual inequality.276
B. ERA Scrutiny of Facially Neutral Action Should Not Depend
Upon a Motivational Inquiry
Although there clearly is a need for ERA scrutiny of facially
neutral but factually discriminatory governmental conduct, there
has been little legislative or judicial attention paid to whether such
scrutiny requires any motivational inquiry. This is not surprising,
since the issues of "motivation" and "intent" have only recently
become determinative in constitutional law.2  Establishing that an
pregnancy, for example, would affect only women who are pregnant; those regulating
sperm donors would affect only men who donate sperm. Such official action would be di-
rectly linked to actual individual characteristics in a way in which express gender lines are
not. Prohibiting all recognition of sex-unique physical characteristics would prevent gov-
ernment from accommodating these characteristics in ways which may not cause sexual
inequality. See, e.g., Yale ERA Study, supra note 256, at 393. Indeed, some argue that such
recognition may be essential to advancing equality. See, e.g., Krieger and Cooney, supra
note 167; Scales, supra note 85. See also E. WoLGAST, supra note 167. But see supra note
167.
274. To justify such a classification, the government would bear the burden of demon-
strating that it is necessary and that the meaning for it is compelling. See Hearings, supra
note 260 (testimony of Thomas Emerson, at 7-8) (testimony of Ann Freedman, at 5) (testi-
mony of Laurence Tribe, at 6); see also Yale ERA Study, supra note 256, at 893. This stan-
dard is different from that which would be applied in ERA-based claims involving explicit
gender classifications. See infra note 285.
275. See Soifer, supra note 205, at 407 (significance of term "abridgement"); ef. Baker,
Neutrality, Process and Rationality: Flawed Interpretations of Equal Protection, 58 Tx. L. Rv.
1029, 1035 (1980) (suggesting a possible linguistic connection between the wording of the
equal protection clause and the narrow disparate impact doctine under that provision).
276. Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
277. The cases introducing these criteria are recent. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256 (1979) (see supra notes 206-40 and accompanying text); Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1971) (see supra notes 178-205 and accompanying text).
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official decisionmaker acted with the intent to harm members of
the disadvantaged group was not a necessary condition to close
scrutiny under the equal protection clause when Congress consid-
ered the ERA prior to approving it in 1972, or when most states
enacted their own ERAs. 78 Accordingly, there was no "discrimi-
natory purpose requirement" to consider. Now that this require-
ment has become critical in sex-discrimination claims under the
equal protection clause, such consideration cannot be avoided.
The determination that disparate-impact claims are subject to
searching scrutiny under the ERA should not depend upon an in-
quiry into the motivation of government officials. 27 9 As developed
above, requiring a challenger to prove that decisionmakers were
motivated by a desire to harm the disadvantaged sex fundamen-
tally misconceives the problem of sex discrimination. 280 Rather
than providing an effective way to weed out insubstantial claims,
such a threshold burden erects an impervious barrier to chal-
lenges against this form of discrimination 281 and serves to legiti-
mate the role of government in perpetuating sexual inequality. 82
If principles limiting the scrutiny and potential invalidation of
facially neutral actions under the ERA are considered necessary, it
278. The most recent state to adopt a constitutional equal rights provision is Massa-
chusetts, which did so in 1976. MAss. CONST. part I, art. I. See generally supra note 15.
Interpretations of state constitutional provisions have not answered this question. See Moe
v. Secretary of Admin. and Finance, 382 Mass. 629, 664, 417 N.E.2d 387, 407 (Mass. Sup.
Ct. 1981) (Hennessey, J., dissenting) ("[tihis court has not yet fully addressed the question
of what, if any, proof of discriminatory intent is required to make out a prima facie show-
ing under the Equal Rights Amendment").
The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts has certified a question to the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court which squarely poses the issue of how the Massachu-
setts ERA applies in a case challenging a facially neutral unemployment compensation eligi-
bility requirement. Buchanan v. Doody, No. 82-0067-C (D. Mass. 1983) (order certifying
question). See Brief for Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts as Amicus Curiae at 7, 84-
35, Buchanan v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., No. 3334 (Mass. Sup. Ct.) (1983)
(arguing that proof of intent should not be required to trigger meaningful scrutiny under
the Massachusetts ERA).
279. See Hearings, supra note 260 (testimony of Thomas Emerson at 9-12) (testimony
of Ann Freedman, at 5-10).
280. See supra text accompanying note 227.
281. See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 141 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also
notes 229-38 and accompanying text.
282. This doctrine is also problematic in addressing racial discrimination and should
be rejected as too limited a view of race equality under the equal protection clause. See, e.g.,
Brest, supra note 179; Eisenberg, supra note 179; Perry, supra note 179; Schnapper, Perpet-
uation of Past Discrimination, 96 HAiv. L. REv. 828 (1983). But see, e.g., Blumstein, supra
note 178.
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is essential to carefully tailor them to the problems of sexual ine-
quality targeted by the constitutional provision. Such limiting
principles can be addressed both to ihe elements of plaintiff's
prima facie case28s and the level of judicial scrutiny required once
plaintiff's initial burden has been satisfied.S As to the former,
however, any threshold requirements imposed should be less re-
strictive than the narrow discriminatory-purpose standard cur-
rently applied to claims under the equal protection clause. As to
the latter, an appropriate level of judicial review should be rigor-
ous yet less likely to require invalidation than the scrutiny ac-
corded explicit sex classifications under the ERA.285
1. Threshold requirements. The elements of plaintiff's prima
facie case in an ERA-premised challenge to facially neutral action
should be designed to trigger careful judicial scrutiny of all ac-
tions that present problems of sexual inequality under law. The
first threshold burden in any case, of course, would be to require
plaintiff to establish that the challenged action disproportionately
affects the sexes.'
There is ample precedent to guide courts in determining
whether this burden has been sufficiently satisfied to support an
inference of sex discrimination. The Supreme Court has evaluated
disparate impact in cases involving employment-discrimination
claims287 and jury selection, 2 " and has ruled that evidence of
283. See infra notes 286-307 and accompanying text.
284. See infra notes 310-16 and accompanying text. In addition to such principles to
limit the scope of judicial review, concern about the cost of invalidating facially neutral
rules, either to third parties or to government, also can be addressed at the remedy stage
after a finding of liability. See Schnapper, supra note 282, at 845-61; Note, Discriminatory
Purpose and Mens Rea: The Tortured Argument of Invidious Intent, 93 YALE L.J. 111 (1983).
285. The only circumstances in which an explicit sex classification would withstand
scrutiny under the ERA would be when it is either narrowly tailored to remedy sex ine-
quality or necessary to harmonize the requirements of this constitutional provision with
other individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution. See Hearings, supra note 260 (testi-
mony of Thomas Emerson, at 8-10) (testimony of Ann Freedman, at 2) (testimony of Lau-
rence Tribe, at 7). By setting a standard that in most circumstances does not permit the
uncertainty which follows from the balancing approach under the equal protection clause,
the ERA would provide a mandate for comprehensive legislative reform during the two-
year compliance period before it takes effect. Rather than continue to use sex as a proxy
for individual characteristics, government would be required to define the relevant charac-
teristics and functions, and determine the rights and responsibilities of women and men
according to these standards.
286. See Hearings, supra note 260 (testimony of Laurence Tribe, at 7).
287. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. at 321, 329-30, 330 n.12 (women ex-
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gross statistical disparity between the composition of the group
benefited and the relevant general population may constitute
prima facie proof of discrimination."" In the absence of gross nu-
merical disparity, there are several methods for evaluating statisti-
cal significance.290
Proof of discriminatory purpose was added to plaintiff's prima
facie burden in claims under the equal protection clause in order
to further limit judicial review of facially neutral official action
that produces factually discriminatory impact. Other approaches
have been proposed, however, that would strike a more reasona-
ble balance between concern for legislative autonomy, the appro-
priate role of judicial review, and the need to eliminate discrimi-
nation. 91 The search for alternative points between the poles of
"disparate impact" alone and "motive to harm" has prompted,
for example, proposals to modify the discriminatory-intent re-
quirement to make it more inclusive by altering the meaning of
intent.2 9 2 In fact, as discussed above,2 98 in some race-discrimina-
cluded from consideration as correctional counselors at a far greater rate than men due to
minimum height and weight requirements); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 480 n.6
(blacks found to have lower high-school-completion rates and lower passing rates in partic-
ular standardized tests).
288. See, e.g., Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550, 552 (1967) (relative absence of
blacks in state's petit and grand juries); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 480-81 (1954)
(relative absence of Mexican-Americans in Texas's jury commissions, petit and grand
juries).
289. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340
n.20 (1977) (such an imbalance is probative because it is often a telltale sign of purposeful
discrimination); Smith College v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 376 Mass.
221, 228 n.9, 380 N.E.2d 121, 125 n.9 (1978) ("[i]n a proper case, gross statistical dispari-
ties alone may constitute prima fade proof of a practice of discrimination").
290. These methods include the standard deviation theory of statistics; see Hazelwood
School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 311 n.17 (1977); Castaneda v. Partida, 430
U.S. 482, 496 n. 17 (1977); the "four-fifths" rule, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1983) (U.S.
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n's Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection
Procedures); and judicially developed thresholds for inferring disparate impact. See 3 L.
LARSON, EMPLoYMENT DISCRMINATION § 74.52 (1983).
291. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 179, at 22-53 (suggesting, inter alia, that proof of dispa-
rate impact creates a rebuttable presumption of intent); Eisenberg, supra note 179, at 36
(causation principle); Perry, supra note 179, at 563-89 (proposing flexible standard of re-
view and contextual limits); Schnapper, supra note 282, at 840-61 (describing different
ways racial discrimination can be perpetuated and suggesting analysis for each); Note, supra
note 284, at 126 (a broader definition of intent).
292. The Model Penal Code, for example, recognizes concepts in addition to "pur-
pose" as distinct levels of intent that can satisfy the mens rea requirement. See Note, supra
note 284, at 121. Knowledge, recklessness, and negligence describe mental states where
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tion claims the Court has pursued a more multi-factored analysis
than the search for malice deemed necessary in sex-discrimination
claims after Feeney. An intent standard that looks to concepts such
as knowledge, recklessness, and negligence, and to objective fac-
tors such as the foreseeability of consequences, would embrace a
wider range of governmental conduct than would a subjective dis-
criminatory-purpose test.
At a minimum, if an intent test is adopted, it should be objec-
tive. Yet while an objective intent requirement would mitigate
some of the most intractable problems inherent in the Feeney pur-
pose requirement, 29 it would not eliminate them all. Problems of
proof would continue, 95 as would the potentially divisive focus on
the official decisionmakers themselves.'" Given the erratic history
of the intent issue in Supreme Court decisions,29 the baggage of
confusing precedent would be difficult to shed. Moreover, as em-
phasized earlier,29 8 centering attention on "intent," even if its def-
inition were broadened, would still be misplaced because it would
misconceive the ways in which sex-biased policies are perpetuated.
This approach presumes that discrimination must be analyzed by
identifying "perpetrators" of discriminatory acts; it ignores the
"victim's" perspective, failing to address the ways in which sexual
actors are pursuing some purposes other than the result forbidden by the law. Id. at 122 &
n.69. For analysis applying these criminal-law concepts to race-discrimination claims under
the fourteenth amendment, see id. at 124-28.
Similar terms have been developed in tort law, as have concepts distinguishing between
intent (the immediate objective) and motive or purpose (more remote ends). See generally
W. Paossva, LAw oF TORTS, §§ 8, 28-34 (4th ed. 1971). For a discussion of other distinc-
tions between intent, motive and purpose, see Weinzweig, supra note 203, at 303-08.
293. See supra notes 200-03 and accompanying text. The Court has extended the nar-
row Feeney approach, however, to some race discrimination claims. In General Building
Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982), for example, the Court ruled that
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982) reaches only purposeful discrimination. As is obvious from the
facts emphasized by the dissent, the discriminatory effect was a foreseeable consequence of
the employer's decision to delegate hiring decisions to an entity which practiced intentional
discrimination. Id. at 414-18 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S.
55 (1980).
294. Indeed, if a broader intent standard had been applied in Feeney, plaintiffs' burden
would have been satisfied. See infra text accompanying note 321.
295. For example, at what point in time would the foreseeablity of consequences be
measured? Given the collective nature of many government decisions, whose knowledge is
relevant? See supra notes 230-35 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 178-205 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 36-51.
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segregation and hierarchy are systematically maintained." 9
Another proposal to define plaintiff's burden as requiring
more than proof of disproportionate adverse impact focuses upon
the relationship between the facially neutral government action
and such impact.300 Writing primarily about race-discrimination
claims, Theodore Eisenberg suggests adopting a "causation princi-
ple" to guide litigants and courts.30 1 This approach would require
a plaintiff to establish that (1) the disparate impact can be traced
to a race-dependent decision by government or private parties
aided by government, 2 and that (2) there are no significant inter-
vening causes between that decision and the harm.303 The perpet-
uation of prior discrimination would be prohibited in some but
not all cases under this approach.30
Legal scholars testifying in 1983 about the proposed federal
ERA offered a limiting principle that is more directly rooted in an
understanding of sexual inequality than these earlier proposals. 0 5
As Professor Ann Freedman explained, once a plaintiff has
demonstrated sex-discriminatory impact, the only additional
threshold issue should be whether such impact "is traceable to
and reinforces, or perpetuates, discriminatory patterns similar to
those associated with facial discrimination."30 6 This limiting prin-
ciple focuses upon the harm that is caused rather than the motiva-
tion of the official decisionmakers, and does not require plaintiff
to unravel a complex chain of events to show how the disparate
impact was caused.
Requiring a correlation to patterns of discrimination similar
to those associated with facial discrimination as the only additional
element of a plaintiff's prima facie case reflects the reality that
even indifference to the impact of a law on women may be
299. Cf. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MWNN. L. REv. 1049 (1978).
300. See Eisenberg, supra note 179, at 57-83. For criticism of Eisenberg's proposal, see
Perry, A Brief Comment on Motivation and.Impact, 15 SAN Duzo L. REV. 1173, 1178-81
(1978).
301. Eisenberg, supra note 179, at 57-58. The causation principle draws heavily on
tort law.
302. Id. at 58-89, 64-66 ("cause in fact").
303. Id. at 59-60, 66-68 ("proximate cause").
304. Id. at 60-61, 69-70.
305. See Hearings, supra note 260 (testimony of Thomas Emerson, at 9-12) (testimony
of Ann Freedman, at 5-10) (testimony of Laurence Tribe, at 7).
306. Id. (testimony of Ann Freedman, at 6).
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anchored in the same stereotypic thinking about women's place,
or generalizations about women's characteristics or abilities, which
result in the use of sex as an explicit determinant. This approach
appropriately directs attention to whether the disparate conse-
quences reinforce sexual inequality and it acknowledges that an
understanding of patterns of sex discrimination continues to
evolve. While not intended as an onerous burden on plaintiffs, this
proposal would serve to limit ERA scrutiny to those situations in
which the impact reinforces or perpetuates sex-based discrimina-
tion, rather than those in which it merely results in differential
treatment.
3 07
The search for more exclusionary requirements to trigger
careful scruting of disparate-impact claims misses the key point: it
is only by closely examining the content of the challenged action
that the illusory nature of some seemingly "neutral" standards
can be exposed, and the subtle forms of sexual inequality can be
remedied. The fact that judges regularly scrutinize neutral prac-
tices once significant adverse impact is established in statutory dis-
crimination claims8 8 confirms both the manageability and impor-
tance of rigorously scrutinizing disparate impact claims under the
ERA.309
307. See Hearings, supra note 260 (testimony of Ann Freedman, at 8-9). An example of
a claim that would be denied ERA scrutiny under this analysis is the hypothetical argument
that a progressive tax system discriminates against males. Since a progressive tax system
imposes greater taxes, proportionally, on higher income wage earners, it could be argued
that such a tax results in a more disparate adverse impact on males because of the well-
documented wage gap. See supra note 6. Even if such impact could be established, how-
ever, a plaintiff would be unable to meet the second prong of the prima facie case, since
this disparity would not reinforce the discriminatory income gap; in fact, it serves to miti-
gate the disparity between men's and women's earnings.
308. See supra notes 184-90 and accompanying text.
809. Concern that if facially neutral action were invalidated as sexually discriminatoryjudicial remedies would be difficult to fashion similarly should be tempered by the fact that
courts already are called upon to remedy the "systemic effects of government action" when
other public policies are deemed violated. See, e.g., Chayes, The Supreme Court 1981 Term-
Foreward: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HAiv. L. Rav. 4 (1982); Eisenberg &
Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HAuv. L. REv. 465
(1980). Professor Chayes suggests that these claims on judicial attention are "traceable to
the central phenomenon of the modern administrative state." He also points out that
avoiding judicial action by professing deference to other decisionmakers is a form of "leg-
erdemain": every judicial decision represents a conclusion about public policy alternatives.
Rather than avoiding the remedy issue by a doctrine which inevitably results in no finding
of liability, concerns about the effects of invalidating challenged conduct on government
and third parties should more appropriately focus attention on the range of remedial relief
1984]
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As the next Section makes clear, moreover, a determination
that scrutiny is triggered marks the beginning, not the end, of the
inquiry; it is not proposed that the ERA create a strict-liability
theory for disparate-impact claims. Once a court determines that
facially neutral action has an adverse impact "on account of sex"
and that scrutiny is required, the court must then consider
whether the action is invalid under the ERA.
2. Level of judicial scrutiny. The most appropriate limiting
principle to achieve a balance between the concern for legislative
autonomy and the goal of eliminating sexual inequality under law
emerges from a recognition that challenges to facially neutral ac-
tion should not be subjected to the same scrutiny applied in cases
involving more explicit discrimination. 10 In cases involving osten-
sibly neutral rules, a more flexible approach should weigh several
factors, including the importance and legitimacy of the objective
sought by the challenged action, and the extent to which that ob-
jective is actually served. 11 The most critical factor, however,
must be whether the decisionmaker's objectives, once deemed suf-
ficient by the Court, could be served in ways that either avoid in-
flicting or mitigate the sex-based harm. 12
Such analysis draws from traditional constitutional inquiry.3 18
It resembles the "business necessity" defense used in deciding ra-
cial and sexual disparate-impact claims under Title VII. As the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit explained in Robin-
son v. Lorillard Corp. :814
which is available. See supra note 284.
310. See supra note 285.
311. See Hearings, supra note 260 (testimony of Thomas Emerson, at 10-11) (testimony
of Ann Freedman, at 9). Critics of current equal protection doctrine have similarly pro-
posed a more flexible standard of review than strict scrutiny for disparate-impact claims
under the equal-protection clause. See Binion, supra note 329, at 447-49. Eisenberg, supra
note 179, at 68-73; Perry, supra note 179, at 559-61, 563-66; Note, supra note 284, at 130-
31.
312. See Hearings, supra note 260 (testimony of Ann Freedman, at 9).
313. See id. (testimony of Thomas Emerson, at 9-10). The inquiry whether less offen-
sive alternatives exist to achieve the governmental objectives has been an essential part of
constitutional analysis when suspect classifications and fundamental interests are at issue.
See generally Note, Equal Protection: A Closer Look at Closer Scrutiny, 76 MicH. L. REv. 771,
871-88 (1978). Less-offensive-alternative analyses have also been adopted by state courts.
See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 378 Mass. 342, 360,
393 N.E.2d 284, 294 (1979).
314. 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
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The test is whether there exists an overriding legitimate business purpose
• . . sufficiently compelling to override any racial impact; the challenged
practice must effectively carry out the business purpose it is alleged to serve,
and there must be available no acceptable alternative policies or practices
which would better accomplish the business purpose advanced, or accom-
plish it equally well with a lesser differential racial impact.315
Under this analysis, the presence of illicit intent continues to be
significant-not as a necessary factor to determine whether action
should be subjected to close scrutiny, but as sufficient to deter-
mine the outcome of the analysis. Clearly, if the objective of the
challenged action is to harm the disadvantaged sex, it would not
be legitimate at all, and on that ground the action should be
invalidated.3 16
3. Application of the limiting principles. The absolute, lifetime
veterans preference for public jobs challenged in Feeney would not
withstand scrutiny under the ERA analysis endorsed here. With
respect to plaintiff's prima facie case, the more inclusive limiting
principles reviewed above817 would plainly be satisfied. First, the
evidence presented clearly established that the challenged statute
had a significant adverse impact upon women. 18 Second, this im-
pact could be traced to, and seen to reinforce, patterns of sexual
inequality familiar in cases involving facial discrimination.1 9 In-
deed, even if the statute were measured against an objective-in-
tent requirement broader than the test applied in Feeney,3 20 plain-
tiff's burden would be met. The district court found, and the
315. 444 F.2d at 798. For citations to lower courts and administrative guidelines using
this standard or some variation of it, see Williams, supra note 84, at 690-91 nn.286-87.
Professor Williams describes the Robinson standard as "precisely analogous" to the compel-
ling state interest test in equal protection law. Id. at 692. In addition, Robinson, like equal
protection doctrine, places the burden of establishing no less discriminatory alternatives on
the defendant. Id. Compare Feeney, 442 U.S. at 284 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[w]here the
foreseeable impact of a facially neutral policy is so disproportionate, the burden should rest
on the State to establish that sex-based considerations played no part in the choice of the
particular legislative scheme").
316. See Brest, supra note 231, at 115-16; Eisenberg, supra note 179, at 99-100;
Weinzweig, supra note 203, at 336-38. The question of whether the presence of illicit mo-
tive should be sufficient to invalidate government conduct even if disparate impact and
familiar patterns of sex inequality are not established is beyond the scope of this article. See
Eisenberg, supra note 179, at 152-56.
317. See supra notes 298-307 and accompanying text.
318. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 260-61, 271.
319. See id. at 283-85 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
320. See supra notes 293-95 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court accepted, that the veterans preference law had a
forseeably devastating impact on women's employment
prospects. 3 21
Once exposed to close judicial scrutiny under the ERA, the
challenged absolute preference statute would not be sustained. Al-
though government's interests in rewarding military service and
in not penalizing veterans as they re-enter civilian life were found
to be compelling, the means Massachusetts chose to serve this ob-
jective were unnecessarily extreme. 22 As Justice Marshall empha-
sized in his dissent, and as other jurisdictions have demon-
strated, 23 there are ways in which veterans preference schemes
can aid veterans without heaping such unlimited disadvantages on
women. The government's objective can be achieved without ri-
gidifying sexual hierarchy in public jobs.
Other facially neutral rules described in Section I similarily
are likely to be held invalid if scrutinized under the ERA. For ex-
ample, the arbitrary one-third alimony rule would probably not
survive the analysis described here, just as it failed to survive re-
view when considered in light of the Pennsylvania ERA.3  Other
laws rooted in a failure to value the nonfinancial contribution of
homemakers to a marriage would also be vulnerable under the
ERA.3 25 Since the overwhelming majority of homemakers are
women, such laws most certainly have a direct and significantly
adverse impact on women. It is difficult to contemplate how such
rules could be necessary to achieve any compelling governmental
purpose.
If these or other official actions are challenged in court, how-
ever, the consequence of ERA scrutiny will depend on a particu-
larized factual development and analysis; accordingly, the out-
come of such claims is not amenable to certain prediction. The
scrutiny is by definition "fact-based": it requires determining the
extent of the disproportionate adverse impact, the nature of such
impact, the objective government actually seeks to serve, the ex-
321. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 278. Accord 442 U.S. at 283-84 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See
Weinzweig, supra note 203, at 290-92.
322. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 286-88 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
323. Id. at 285, n.2. See also id. at 261 nn.6-7 (describing other employment prefer-
ence programs).
324. See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 118-35 and accompanying text.
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tent to which the objective is served by the challenged practice,
and whether less drastic alternatives exist to achieve such an ob-
jective. Analysis as to whether the asserted objective is compelling
and the challenged practice is necessary can only be undertaken
once facts such as these are developed. 26 Indeed, the reason that
invalidation of the extreme veterans-preference law at issue in Fee-
ney can be predicted is that the factual development necessary in
that case already has taken place.
Absent such factual development, it is more difficult to pre-
dict the result of a particular ERA-premised disparate-impact
claim. Even without an intent requirement, demonstrating signifi-
cant adverse impact often is not a simple task. 27 Moreover, any
balancing of the factors discussed undoubtedly can be flexible in
judges' hands.3 28 But the prospect of such uncertainty is far pref-
erable to the current approach under equal protection law, in
which the process of scrutinizing factual discrimination is rou-
tinely avoided. While it is true that the purpose requirement cur-
rently imposed in equal protection claims produces the greater
certainty that facially neutral rules will always be upheld, the cost
of this certainty is too high: it requires us to "settle for the consti-
tutionalization of the status quo" ' of sexual inequality. Such an
approach makes it impossible to realize the essential principle un-
derlying the ERA: that equality of the sexes under the law is un-
mistakably a fundamental policy of this nation.
Moreover, while this Article has focused on the judicial scru-
tiny to be applied under the ERA when discrimination challenges
are brought into the courtroom, it is important to acknowledge
the broader implications that flow from constitutional principles
of equality. These principles influence the official decisionmaking
process and our understanding of what equality means. Where ap-
plication of the equal protection clause now legitimates and leaves
unexamined conduct that is facially neutral, analysis under the
326. See The Impact of the Equal Rights Amendment Upon Abortion Rights: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 134-
35 (testimony of Ann Freedman) (1984).
327. See, e.g., New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584-87 (1979);
Friedman, The Burger Court and the Prima Fade Case in Employment Discrimination Litigation:
A Critique, 65 CoiREu. L. REv. 1, 17 (1979).
328. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 158, at 962-64; Freeman, supra note 299, at 1052
(manipulability of legal doctrine).
329. Soifer, supra note 205, at 409.
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ERA, as developed here, would prompt a careful examination of
its content. The greatest impact of such change is likely to be real-
ized not in the courts, but in guiding legislative reform and future
government decisionmaking 830 This doctrine would require that
in the face of evidence that a program or policy has a discrimina-
tory impact on account of sex, decisionmakers should look for
other ways to meet their objectives and, if necessary, should re-
consider the objectives themselves. In this way, the ERA would
provide a basis for prompting respect and concern for sexual
equality when the policies are designed. Until such concern be-
comes an integral and conscious part of government's decision-
making process, it is likely that purportedly neutral rules will con-
tinue to reflect sex-biased assumptions and perpetuate the tragic
subordination of women.33 1
CONCLUSION
Supreme Court decisions during the past decade in cases in-
volving sex-discrimination claims under the equal protection
clause have not transformed that provision into a constitutional
guarantee of sexual equality under law. In particular, the failure
to develop an adequate disparate-impact doctrine under the equal
330. Cf. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. RaV. 1281,
1296 (1976). Among the ways in which legislative reform is guided is by influencing the
agenda for action is that during any given legislative session. Legislative actions to counter
inequality of the sexes are frequently "back-burnered." See S. REP. 689, supra note 257, at
11. One of the most significant consequences of ERA ratification often pointed to is that
the amendment would provide the impetus to "move this reform to the front burner." See
id. at 11. This already has happened in states that have added equal rights provisions to
their state constitutions. Id. at 23. See B. BROWN, supra note 112, at 3-4 (describing legisla-
tive and administrative implementation of state ERAs). See also supra note 264 and accom-
panying text.
331. Cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 213 n.5 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("per-
petuation of a stereotyped attitude" as dominant factor in legislative classification of 18-
year-olds by sex for alcohol consumption):
This is not intended to suggest that a constitutional principle such as the ERA can itself
transform anyone's understanding of sexual equality, or that law reform alone can elimi-
nate sexual inequality. Indeed, given the interactive process of amending the Constitution,
it is unlikely that the ERA will become the law of this nation before a sufficient consensus
exists supporting the view of sexual equality presented here. Accepting a constitutional
principle of equality that means less, however, is not really an alternative at all for achiev-
ing the goals of relieving both sexes from the role-typing society has long imposed and to
ending sexual segregation and hierarchy. See Z. EsENsTmN, THE RADICAL FUTURE OF Lin-
EAL FEMnnSM 19, 160, 222-36 (1981).
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protection clause serves to shield from scrutiny governmental con-
duct that, while formally neutral, is factually discriminatory. The
existing doctrine is fundamentally incapable of exposing the neu-
trality where it is illusory, remedying the discrimination where it
is subtle, and ending the inequality that results. As long as the
smoking gun of illicit intent cannot be uncovered (either because
it is hidden too well or because it does not exist), discriminatory
governmental action is insulated from judicial condemnation. By
sanctioning governmental rules that appear neutral but are
designed from a sex-biased perspective, this conception of equal
treatment ignores the fact that such rules are a potent mechanism
for maintaining sexual inequality.
It is conceivable, of course, that the doctrines currently pre-
vailing under the equal protection clause may someday be altered,
and advocates of sexual equality should pursue a strategy to
achieve this end. But given the history of the fourteenth amend-
ment, the narrow view of equality reflected in current equal pro-
tection decisions, and the dynamics through which judge-made
doctrine is developed, it is unlikely that this provision will ever set
an adequate constitutional standard to prompt the reform and
guide the design of governmental action, and to inform judges
called upon to resolve sex-bias claims.
In contrast to the equal protection clause, the ERA would
provide a constitutional principle directly targeted to securing
equality of rights under law on account of sex. To accomplish this
goal, it is essential that the ERA reach the subtle as well as the
now obvious ways in which official action perpetuates the subordi-
nation of women. This requires doctrines independent of those
developed under the equal protection clause regarding sex-related
differences and facially neutral rules. Sexual inequality will persist
as long as discrimination is viewed as merely a problem of drawing
explicit classification lines between the sexes.
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